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Ballot Box Budgeting in California:
The Bane of the Golden State or
an Overstated Problem?
by JESSICA A. LEVINSON* AND ROBERT M. STERN**
Introduction
California's fiscal crisis is a source of national, if not international
concern. The question is: what caused the state's fiscal crisis? This
Article addresses one potential cause of the state's current fiscal
predicament-ballot box budgeting. This term refers to legislative
measures and initiatives that are placed on the ballot and affect the
state's budget. This Article will focus on the benefits and detriments
of budgeting by initiative. It will also explore the differences between
ballot box budgeting and the process of legislative budgeting.
* Jessica A. Levinson is the Director of Political Reform at the Center for
Governmental Studies ("CGS"). She is also an adjunct professor at Loyola Law School,
where she teaches a class on campaign finance laws. Her work at CGS focuses on
governance issues, including campaign finance, ethics, ballot initiatives, redistricting, term
limits, and state budgets. Prior to joining CGS, she practiced civil litigation at Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett, LLP. Before entering private practice, she clerked in the Central
District of California for the Honorable James V. Selna. She received her J.D. from
Loyola Law School, where she graduated cum laude and Order of the Coif, and her B.A.
in English and Economics from Loyola Marymount University, where she graduated
magna cum laude and as the class valedictorian.
** Robert M. Stern is President of the Center for Governmental Studies. He began
drafting and analyzing political reform laws as a staff attorney for the California
Legislature's Assembly Elections Committee; he then served as the Elections Counsel to
the California Secretary of State's office. He has drafted numerous state initiatives, was
the principal co-author of California's 1974 Political Reform Act, adopted by seventy
percent of California's voters, and was a principal drafter of the City of Los Angeles'
Ethics and Public Campaign Financing laws in 1990. He was the first general counsel of
California's Fair Political Practices Commission before coming to CGS in 1983. He is a
graduate of Pomona College and Stanford Law School. The authors would like to thank
Matt Siordia for his invaluable research assistance.
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This Article proposes that all measures calling for increased
funding identify funding sources. Further, measures that reduce
revenue should identify which program(s) will be cut. Also, any
measures that call for the floating of bonds should identify any
program(s) that will be cut or taxes that will be increased in order to
pay for these bonds in the short term. When making fiscal policy,
whether it is by initiative or by legislative measure, the consequences
of those decisions must be made clear to the voters. In addition, this
Article calls for the reduction of the requirement that two-thirds of
the members of both legislative houses pass a budget. This
requirement should be reduced to fifty-five percent, allowing
lawmakers to pass a budget without dissolving into partisan
wrangling. This Article also makes suggestions for ways to improve
the initiative process which would be beneficial to the process of
budgeting by initiative.
Part I of this Article addresses two facets of California's
governmental structure that make California unusual when discussing
the issue of budgeting by initiative: The requirement that budgets are
passed by a vote of two-thirds of the members of both houses, and the
fact that initiatives in California can address fiscal issues. This section
of the Article briefly traces the roots and usage of the initiative
process in California. Part II of this Article introduces the issue of
balloting by initiative. Part III of this Article begins by comparing the
legislative and initiative processes and then briefly addresses a few
issues raised by ballot box budgeting, including voter competence, the
influence of special interests, voter turnout, and implementation of
ballot measures. In Part IV of this Article, we address different ways
that ballot box budgeting can affect the state's budget-taxes, budget
allocations, direct outlays, bond measures, and criminal law issues.
Parts V and VI of this Article contain our recommendations for
reform. Part VII of this Article contains some reform proposals
which we think merit further discussion, but which we do not endorse
at this time. We conclude by making some brief predictions about the
future of ballot box budgeting.
I. California is Unusual When it Comes to Ballot Box
Budgeting
Before discussing the pros and cons of permitting ballot
measures to address fiscal issues in California, it is important to note
that California is unique in several ways. First, not only is California
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the most populous state in the nation,1 but unlike many other states,
the California budget must be passed by a two-thirds vote of both the
Assembly and the Senate.2 Second, ballot initiatives can affect every
aspect of the state budget. An examination of ballot box budgeting is
informed by a brief discussion of both of those issues.
A. The Two-Thirds Requirement
Only two other states, Arkansas and Rhode Island, have similar
supermajority requirements for the passage of a budget? Together
the populations of Arkansas, approximately 2.8 million, and Rhode
Island, approximately one million, equal about 3.8 million, roughly
the same as the population of Los Angeles City.' California's
population totals around thirty-seven million Taking into account
the state's size and diversity of political views, at least as compared to
Arkansas and Rhode Island, it is a Herculean task for two-thirds of its
elected officials to agree on a budget. It would be difficult to get two-
thirds of the electorate to agree on a budget.6
The two-thirds requirement means that the party in the majority
(currently in California, this is the Democratic Party) must make
concessions and compromises in order to get enough members of the
minority party (currently, the Republican Party) to approve the
1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2009,
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2009-01.csv (last visited Dec. 24, 2009).
2. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
3. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass
the Budget: A Legisbrief, Vol. 6, No. 48 (Nov./Dec. 1998 - updated Oct. 2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?Tabld=12654. California also requires two-thirds of the
members of both houses pass tax increases. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12. California is the
only state that has a supermajority requirement to pass the budget and tax increases. In
Arkansas, three-fourths of the legislature must agree on appropriations for all purposes
except education, highways, and paying down the state debt. Those appropriations
require only a simple majority vote. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 39. In Rhode Island,
appropriations must be passed by a two-thirds majority. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/ (last visited March 25, 2010).
5. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited March 25, 2010).
6. MARK BALDASSARE ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE
SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 14 (2010), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S-ll0MBS.pdf ("Californians are divided on
how to deal with the state's budget deficit: 37% prefer mostly spending cuts and 41%
prefer a mix of spending cuts and tax increases."). In addition, half of Californians favor
lowering the vote requirement to a fifty-five percent majority. Id.
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budget We believe that the budgets enacted as a result of all this
partisan wrangling leave much to be desired s It may come as no
surprise then that voters are not always satisfied with the legislative
compromises necessary for the passage of a budget in California.9
Therefore, California voters may be more likely to take some budget
matters into their own hands.0
While the legislature is required to pass a budget by a vote of
two-thirds of the members of both houses, the people can enact
budgetary initiatives by a simple majority. This means that those
issues important to more than half of the electorate, but which cannot
be fully realized in the legislative budgeting process, are ripe for
enactment by initiative."
7. See, e.g., Steve Lawrence, California's Two-Thirds Budget Vote In The
Crosshairs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2009/02/22/state/n122935S52.DTL.
8. See, e.g., Claire Suddath, Spotlight: California's Budget Crisis, TIME, July 27,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910985,00.html;
Lenny Goldberg, A Rational Budget Solution is Within our Grasp, CAPITOL WEEKLY,
May 1, 2008, available at http://www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=x32mohty0esops;
Lawrence, supra note 7 ("The deadlocks have often left the state unable to pay some of its
bills, including payments to businesses that supply prisons, state hospitals and other
facilities. The latest stalemate, to enact a midyear budget fix because of declining revenue
and set the budget for next fiscal year, also held up state income tax refunds.");
BALDASSARE, supra note 6 ("[N]early all Californians view the state budget situation as a
problem. Seventy-five percent call it a big problem, while 21% call it somewhat of a
problem." Regarding lowering the vote threshold to pass a state budget, half of residents
(51%) call this a good idea and 39% call it a bad one. Among likely voters, 52% call it a
good idea and 41% a bad one. Perhaps due to the protracted negotiations of recent years,
this idea has grown somewhat more popular. For example, in May 2008, 42% said it was a
good idea to lower the voting threshold. By January 2009, the percentage had grown to
54% and to 51% today.).
9. See generally BALDASSARE, supra note 6, at 14 ("Most Californians view the
budget situation as a big problem . ").
10. Id. at 5 ("On the issue of long-term reform of the budget process, most (72%)
Californians believe that they-not their leaders-should make reform decisions at the
ballot box.").
11. We will leave for another article an in-depth discussion of the effect of the two-
thirds requirement on the budget process. For purposes of this article, we merely point
out that the two-thirds requirement creates a structure of legislative budgeting that leads
to the creation and enactment of budgets, which may be unpopular with many members of
the electorate, and may therefore lead to an increase in so-called ballot box budgeting.
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B. Budgeting by Initiative
California is among a little less than half of states that have the
initiative process which permit budgeting by initiative. 2 Budgeting by
initiative allows citizens to affect "the oldest and most basic
prerogative of representative governments-their authority to levy
taxes and control public expenditures."' 3  In order to examine the
concept of ballot box budgeting, it is necessary to discuss the roots of
one of the two ways that voters can make budgetary policy-the
initiative process. The initiative process allows the electorate to
propose and enact new laws, including amendments to the state
constitution, without any involvement by the legislature or the
governor.' Through the initiative process, the electorate can exercise
many of the legislative and executive powers traditionally reserved
for the first and second branches of government."i
C. The Roots of the Initiative Process
The concept of involving the electorate in lawmaking is far from
a novel test in governing. The foundation of what is now known as
the initiative process began in Athens, Greece, when men would
come together to debate and decide various political issues. 6 In 1898,
South Dakota became the first state to adopt the initiative process.
The initiative process was adopted before universal women's suffrage,
direct election of U.S. Senators, social security, or the federal income
tax."' Currently, twenty-four states have adopted initiative
12. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R
TASK FORCE, 17-20 (July 2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR-report.pdf.
13. Thomas Gais and Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of
Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1292
(1995).
14. Chip Lowe, Public Safety Legislation and Referendum Power: A Reexamination,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 591, 594 (1986); see also California Secretary of State's Office, "How to
Qualify An Initiative," available at http:l/www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/how-
to-qualify-an-initiative/htm.
15. See generally CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE
(2008), available at http://www.cgs.orgimages/publications/cgs-dbi-full-book-f.pdf.
16. Catherine Engberg, Taking the Initiative: May Congress Reform State Initiative
Lawmaking to Guarantee A Republican Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 569, 573
(2001).
17. John G. Matsusaka, Initiatives: Slouching Toward Respectability?, 8 ELECTION
L.J. 55, 56 (2009).
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processes.18 California adopted the initiative process in 1911, as part
of a larger reform package proposed by Progressive Governor Hiram
Johnson. 9
California enacted the initiative process in order "to check state
legislatures, increase voter turnout, measure public interest and
support for various causes, and enact public policies that state
legislators would not or could not make law themselves." 20 The state
also enacted the initiative process "to allow the people to circumvent
the traditional legislative process when it is dominated by powerful
narrow interests., 21 In the early twentieth century, many Californians
believed that the Southern Pacific Railroad all but controlled the
legislature.22
Direct democracy was primarily advocated by two schools of
thought Populists and Progressives.23 Initiative scholar Kenneth P.
Miller had argued that the difference between these two schools of
thought is that Populists wanted an initiative process which fully
bypassed the legislature and gave lawmaking power directly to the
people, while Progressives believed the initiative process should
merely provide a check on representative government.24
D. The Use of the Initiative Process in California
Nationally and statewide, since the 1970s, the total number of
initiatives has increased each decade.25 In California, between 1912
18. Initiative and Referendum Institute, available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
statewidei&r.htm.
19. Engberg, supra note 16, at 574; see generally CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, supra note 15.
20. Elizabeth F. Maher, When A Majority Does Not Rule: How Supermajority
Requirements on Voter Initiatives Distort Elections and Deny Equal Protection, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2008).
21. Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 239, 243 (2004); see also Maher, supra note 20.
22. Hank Dempsey, The 'Overlooked Hermaphrodite' of Campaign Finance:
Candidate-Controlled Ballot Measure Committees in California Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV.
123, 128 (2007).
23. John Gildersleeve, Editing Direct Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of
Ballot Initiatives Offend the First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1441 (2007).
24. Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative
Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2001).
25. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 56.
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and 2008, 325 initiatives qualified for the ballot, and 111 were
approved by the voters.26
The initiative process is deeply ingrained in California's history.
In California, initiatives can affect everything from money flowing
into the government (taxes and other revenues), to money spent by
the government (interest on bonds, forced allocations of portions of
the budget to certain programs, such as education) and programs with
unspecified costs, such as criminal laws that increase or decrease the
prison population.27
Ten of the twenty-four states that have the initiative process
restrict initiatives that impose fiscal policies in some way.2 These
states either ban or restrict initiatives that affect budget issues, such as
26. University of California, Hastings College of the Law Library, California Ballot
Propositions, available at http://library.uchastings.edu/library/california-research/ca-ballot-
pamphlets.html; Initiative and Referendum Institute, available at http://www.iandrinst
itute.org. See also Dempsey, supra note 22.
27. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local
Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax
as a Case in Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 511, 518 (2002) ("Voters are now deciding
whether and how to (1) impose or limit existing taxes including sales and income taxes, (2)
impose and limit new taxes, and (3) generally exercise the power to tax. Finally, voters are
directly deciding through mandated appropriations how to spend."); see also California
Secretary of State's Office, "How to Qualify an Initiative," available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm.
28. Gildersleeve, supra note 23, at 1451; Lowe, supra note 14, at 595. In Alaska,
initiatives cannot dedicate revenues or make or repeal appropriations. In Florida,
initiatives proposing tax or fee increases require a two-thirds vote to pass, and initiatives
may not include limits on the ability of the government to raise revenue. In Maine,
initiatives which provide for expenditures in excess of available and unappropriated funds
are inoperative until forty-five days after the legislature convenes, unless the measure
provides for a funding source by raising new revenue to pay for the program. In
Massachusetts, initiatives may not be used to make specific appropriations; however
initiatives which call for the creation of programs may require the legislature to raise taxes
or otherwise find the revenue to fund that program. In Mississippi, initiatives that require
a reduction in revenue or reallocation of funds from currently funded programs must
identify the program(s) whose funding will be reduced or eliminated if the initiative is
passed. In addition, initiative proponents must identify in the initiative the amount and
source of the revenue required to fund the proposed program. In Missouri, initiatives may
not appropriate money, other than the new revenues created and provided for by the
initiative. In Montana, initiatives may not appropriate money. In Nevada, initiatives can
only impose a tax or otherwise provide for raising the revenue necessary to fund a
proposed program; initiatives cannot otherwise make appropriations or other
expenditures of money. In North Dakota, initiatives may not appropriate money to
support and maintain state departments and institutions. In Wyoming, initiatives may not
dedicate revenue or make or repeal appropriations. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 12.
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taxes and appropriations. 29  States which place restrictions on
initiatives that affect budget issues, as opposed to prohibitions,
generally require that initiatives creating a new program identify the
funding source for that program?0 These states also require initiatives
that reduce revenue to identify which program(s) will be cut as a
result. 1 States restrict budgeting by initiative to protect the budget
process "from the volatility of direct democracy. 3 2 We believe that
these states recognize that voters likely want both lower taxes and
more services, and without these restrictions legislatures may be left
trying to fund mandated programs with fewer resources.
II. A Brief Discussion of Budgeting by Initiative
A. Budgeting by Initiative and California's Fiscal Crisis
Is budgeting by initiative harmful to the healthy functioning of
the state? It may be that "[n]owhere is the current need for critical
analysis more compelling than in assessing the cumulative effects of
initiatives-both direct and indirect-on the process leading to the
formulation and implementation of states' fiscal policy with regard to
taxing and spending."33
Many scholars argue that fiscal issues should be decided by
representative lawmakers only.34  Initiatives may "bust a state's
budget" or require legislators to balance the budget by raising
revenue (taxes and fees) and/or cut funding for programs.35 Critics
further contend that budget initiatives leave the legislature with little
room to govern, tie up a large portion of the budget, and hurt the
legislature's ability to create budgets that respond to changing
29. Gildersleeve, supra note 23; see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 12.
30. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 12
31. Id.
32. Gildersleeve, supra note 23, at 1437.
33. Robinson, supra note 27, at 514.
34. Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1191, 1236 (2005); see also Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of
Initiative Lawmaking, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1758 (1998) (describing initiatives which
affect the budget as the "incoherent, irresponsible ... piecemeal dismemberment of a
state's budget").
35. Thad Kousser and Mathew D. McCubbis, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and
Policymaking By Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 967-68 (2005).
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economic times.36 Some initiatives reduce the options that legislators
have when responding to fiscal ups and downs.37 This has a
"potentially crippling effect [on] the ability of elective bodies to
implement a collectively rationalized financial scheme."3 Estimates
vary widely as to what percentage of California's budget is tied up as
a result of voter mandated initiatives. While at least one scholar has
claimed that approximately seventy percent of California's budget is
used according to initiatives,39 others have found that about one-third
of the California budget is earmarked by initiatives.' ° Most of this
forced spending is the result of Proposition 98, an education measure
passed in 1988 that is discussed later in this article. John Matsusaka's
comprehensive empirical studies have cast considerable doubt on
those who claim that a majority of the state's budget is earmarked by
initiatives.4
Has budgeting by initiative caused California's current financial
crisis? There are many causes of California's current fiscal crisis-a
global economic downturn, a tax structure which heavily relies on the
state's top wage earners; budgeting by initiative is just one factor
among many. While we do not believe that budgeting by initiative
alone has caused the current fiscal crisis, we do suggest voters should
36. William M. Lunch, Budgeting by Initiative: An Oxymoron, 34 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 663, 669 (1998) (many initiatives "have the effect of making it increasingly difficult
for legislators who must balance competing interests to craft a balanced state budget.");
see also Linde, supra note 34; see also Kevin O'Leary, The Citizen Assembly: An
Alternative to the Initiative, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1489, 1491-92 (2007) ("[T]he biggest
negative [of the initiative process] is the cumulative effect of ballot measures-some of
them constitutional amendments nearly cast in stone-that severely hamstring state
legislators and governors from doing their jobs.").
37. Garrett, supra note 21, at 278.
38. Robinson, supra note 27, at 518.
39. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, A New Governor Won't Fix What Ails California, Bus.
WK., Sept. 22, 2003, at 24.
40. See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter
Initiatives Paralyzed the California Budget?, 5 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 248, 248 (2005); see
also John W. Ellwood & Mary Sprague, Options for Reforming the California State Budget
Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT
MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 329, 337, 348 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds.,
1995) (claiming that eighty-eight percent of California's budget is earmarked because of
initiatives and federal mandates, and that Proposition 98 and 184 earmark sixty percent of
the state's budget); see also Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of Hybrid
Democracy, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 249 (2006) (discussing claims by Laura Tyson and John
Matsusaka); see also Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421,421 (1998).
41. Matsusaka, supra note 40, at 248.
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know the consequences of their ballot box decisions, such that
measures which reduce revenue identify which programs will be cut,
measures which call for new programs identify where the money for
those programs will come from, and measures which call for the
issuance of bonds identify the programs that will be cut or taxes that
will be increased to pay for those bonds.
B. Budgeting by Initiative and Public Opinion
John Matsusaka has found that successful budget initiatives
affect three areas of fiscal policy.42 First, Matsusaka has found that
states that have the initiative process generally have lower taxation
and less government spending than states without the initiative
process. States that have the initiative process have comparatively
smaller state and local governments than states that do not have the
process.43 Second, spending by states that have the initiative process
is generally more decentralized, in that local governments spend more
and the state spends less." Third, in states that have the initiative
process, local governments tend to raise revenue through fees, rather
than by raising taxes.45 Matsusaka noted that "the initiative pushed
states toward less redistributional revenue structures." 4 This means
that states which have the initiative process tend to have lower broad-
based taxes which tax the wealthier members of society and
redistribute that revenue to the lower economic classes.47
Matsusaka concluded that all of these developments matched
public sentiment.48 Hence, states that have the initiative process have
42. John G. Matsusaka, FOR THE MANY OF THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 206 (2004). See also Matsusaka, supra note 40
(2005); John G. Matsusaka, Subversion of the Many by the Few: Some Scientific Evidence
of the Initiative Process, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 511, 517 (2004).
43. Matsusaka, FOR THE MANY OF THE FEW, supra note 42; see also Matsusaka,
Subversion of the Many by the Few, supra note 42, at 518.
44. As Matsusaka points out, "[l]ocal governments are generally believed to have
superior information to tailor expenditure to public purposes. On the other hand, state
governments tend to have more expertise." Matsusaka, Subversion of the Many by the
Few, supra note 42, at 520.
45. Matsusaka, FOR THE MANY OF THE FEW, supra note 42; see also Michael S.
Kang, Counting on Initiatives?: An Empirical Assessment, 4 ELECTION L.J. 217, 218
(2005). Taxes include income, property and sales taxes. Service charges and user fees
include tuition for state schools, revenue from the use of public hospitals, trash collection
fees, etc. Matsusaka, Subversion of the Many by the Few, supra note 42, at 525.
46. Matsusaka, Subversion of the Many by the Few, supra note 42, at 525.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 529.
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fiscal policies that more closely track public opinion than states
without the initiative process.4 9 Matsusaka has therefore determined
that "the initiative promotes majority rule."' The fact that successful
initiatives reflect public opinion, however, does not mean that those
initiatives always embody beneficial or wise policies. Merely because
the voters favor a certain policy or development does not mean that
that matter is beneficial to the state's overall fiscal well-being.
III. An Introduction to Ballot Box Budgeting
Ballot box budgeting, whether it is accomplished by legislative
measures or by initiatives, has its drawbacks. While the legislative
process at its best is superior to the initiative process at its best,
neither functions in an ideal world. We believe that it is not clear that
voters meaningfully differentiate between legislative measures and
initiatives when they go to the ballot box.
The legislative process is designed to be more deliberative,
conducive to compromise, and to produce better drafted laws than
the initiative process." Laws produced in the legislative process
should be discussed and enacted with a comprehensive view as to how
that law affects other constitutional or statutory provisions. This is
particularly significant with respect to the budget process where
legislators should anticipate how one budgetary provision affects
another, while the voters likely see such measures in isolation.
However, many legislative bills that affect the budget are not
part of the budget process. The legislature, like the voters, may not
take a long-term, comprehensive view of the consequences of its
decisions. Legislators can waive procedural rules, make middle of the
night decisions, and must make compromises to get the required
number of votes. 2 In addition, while ballot initiatives must be
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Kousser, supra note 35, at 968.
51. Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293,
299 (2007). See also K.K. DuVivier, Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death:
The Role Of Direct Democracy in Federalism, 86 OR. L. REV. 895, 898 (2007); Richard
Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1362 (1985) ("Legislators are
expert specialists in lawmaking, equipped with staffs and resources that help them reach
informed decisions. They work through a process of hearings, amendments, revisions, and
debates that promotes reasoned consideration of a bill.").
52. Briffault, supra note 51, at 1362 ("[M]uch legislation is enacted without the
informed, thoughtful analysis or extensive consideration contemplated by the legislative
ideal. Many state legislatures act on a significant number of their bills in marathon sittings
at the end of the legislative session."); see also H.L. Richardson, WHAT MAKES YOU
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available to the public for at least 131 days,53 when the legislature
makes laws, those laws are sometimes unseen by the public until they
are passed.
Further, the legislative process is run by people whose jobs
(unless they are termed out) depend on their ability to win elections,
which in turn depends on their ability to raise money and maintain
popularity with constituents. The legislative process is susceptible to
the influences of contributors and lobbyists." Hence legislators may
be reticent to make wise but unpopular decisions.
The people, by initiative, can enact laws which affect the budget
that the legislature may be unwilling, or unable to enact. For
instance, initiatives which support mental health programs and early
childhood education have been funded by targeting taxes on
millionaires and tobacco users.5  These measures were not
legislatively enacted.
On the other hand, as discussed below, the initiative process is
also too susceptible to the influence of special interests. While the
initiative process was created in part as a check on the influence of
special interests on the legislature, now virtually any initiative can
qualify for the ballot if the initiative proponents have enough money.
Qualification, however, does not equal success. Moneyed interests
also have a great influence in defeating initiative measures.
As compared to the legislative budget process, the problem with
budgeting by initiative is that it is done by an electorate that cannot
amend proposals, but can vote only "yes" or "no" on isolated
proposals drafted approximately one year before they reach the
THINK WE READ THESE BILLS? 37-38 (1978) (A political memoir of former California
state senator, stating "[1legislators consistently vote on legislation without understanding
what is in it, especially when the final vote is taken. Every legislator has his own system
for judging how he will vote, but reading the bill usually isn't part of the procedure, and
listening to debate on the bill's merits certainly isn't either.").
53. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9013 (2009); CAL. CONST. art II, § 8(c).
54. See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching
You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009)
("[L]egislators and bureaucrats are subject to the pressures of lobbying by special
interests."); see also Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of
Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 627 (2008) ("[T]he power of large
contributors not only keeps legislators from 'doing' on behalf of interests opposed to those
of contributors, but from 'talking' about them as well.").
55. In 1998, Californians passed Proposition 10, which imposes an increase in the
cigarette tax. The proceeds are used to fund early childhood education. In 2004,
Californians passed Proposition 63, which provides a one percent increase in the personal
income tax for those with incomes over $1 million. The proceeds of the tax are spent on
mental health services.
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ballot, without regard to how they affect the rest of the budget.16 In
comparison, at least during the budget process, the legislature is privy
to a comprehensive view of the budget.
This section will begin by comparing the legislative and initiative
processes, and will proceed by discussing: (1) voter competence; (2)
the influence of special interests; (3) voter turn out; (4) ballot box
budgeting as a piecemeal approach to budgeting; (5) whether ballot
box budgeting leads to more ballot box budgeting; (6) ballot measure
implementation; and (7) the affects of budgeting by initiative.
A. A Comparison of the Legislative and Initiative Processes
The legislative process is structurally designed to be more
deliberative than the initiative process. 7 James Madison voiced
concern about direct democracy, contending that it lacked the
consideration and compromise intrinsic in a representative
58government. Critics of the initiative process worry that it
undermines representative government and lacks the checks and
balances and deliberateness of representative government." The
Framers created a representative democracy "to ensure that
lawmaking was the product of thoughtful deliberation by elected
representatives, rather than the passions or narrow self-interests of
the people."'
It is all but universally accepted that "the more deliberation, the
better the decision., 61 Lack of deliberation can lead to less than ideal,
or even bad, policy decisions. 62  There are reasons to believe that
there may not be the opportunity for adequate deliberation in
initiative elections and the legislative lawmaking process. The
56. It may be that "[t]he fundamental problem with direct democracy is that it allows
private citizens to make laws free from the electoral accountability and other structural
safeguards of representative democracy." Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular
Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND L. REv. 395,
398 (2003).
57. Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 299; see also DuVivier, supra note 51, at 898.
58. Robinson, supra note 27, at 513.
59. Kang, supra note 45, at 218; see also Staszewski, supra note 56, at 402-03.
60. Staszewski, supra note 56, at 402.
61. John Gastil et al., When Good Voters Make Bad Policies: Assessing and Improving
the Deliberative Quality of Initiative Elections, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 1435, 1436 (2007).
62. See, e.g., Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review
of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 269 (1999) ("The need for a separate
approach for reviewing initiatives stems from the lack of deliberation akin to legislative
filtering in the current initiative process.").
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legislative process in California does not always function at its best-
last minute decisions and waiver of procedural rules allow legislators
to short circuit the lawmaking process and discard meaningful
deliberation.63 It is useful to contrast the process for enacting laws
through both the legislative and initiative processes to test the
veracity of claims that the initiative process does not provide for
adequate deliberation. 6'
1. The Legislative Process
In California, there are a number of different types of legislative
measures which must be put to a vote of the people: (1) bond
measures (which must also be adopted by a two-thirds vote of both
houses and signed by the Governor);6 (2) constitutional amendments
(which must also be adopted by a two-thirds vote of both houses, but
need not be signed by the Governor);' and (3) amendments to
initiatives (which must also be adopted by a simple majority vote of
both houses and be signed by the Governor).67 In each of these areas,
the voters, therefore, have the final say. Bond measures, which can
cost the state billions of dollars; constitutional amendments, which
represent changes to our state's governing document; and
amendments to initiatives which have been passed by a vote of the
people, are all seen as too important to allow the legislature to alter
on its own.
63. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Assembly Tangles over Taxes, L.A. TIMES, July 28,
2010, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/01/assembly-
tangles-over-taxes.htm ("After a half-hour of acrimonious exchanges, Democrats voted
en masse for the tax study and Republicans, suspicious that it is the first step toward
actually imposing the tax, voted as a bloc against the measure."). See also Editorial, The
California Legislature's Water Torture, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/23/opinion/ed-water23; Bettina Boxall, Water Policy
Discussions Roil On, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/oct/12/local/me-waterl2.
64. It is important to remember that in many states like California, measures are
passed using both the legislative and initiative processes. Hence, the proper comparison
should not be between a state with only the legislative process, or a state that only has the
initiative process, but rather a state with the legislative process as compared to a state with
both the initiative and legislative processes.
65. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
66. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4.
67. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10; see also California Secretary of State, Ballot Initiatives,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections-j.htm (last visited March 25, 2010).
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In the California legislature, members of the Assembly or Senate
send an idea to the Legislative Counsel, who then drafts a bill.' The
legislator then introduces the bill in her house of origin.69 The bill is
sent to the Office of State Printing, and no action may be taken for 30
days from the date of the bill's introduction. 7' The bill then goes to
the Rules Committee of either the Assembly or the Senate,
depending on whether an Assemblyperson or Senator introduced the
bill.71 The Rules Committee assigns the bill to a policy committee
depending on the substantive area of the bill.7
The policy committee will hold hearings on the bill, during which
time the author of the bill presents the bill and testimony in support
of, or in opposition to, the bill can be heard.73 The bill can be
amended a number of times.74 In order for the committee to pass the
bill, a majority vote of the full committee must approve the bill.75 If
the bill requires the expenditure of funds, it must also go to the
Senate or Assembly Appropriations Committee, where different bill
analyses are prepared.76
When and if a bill is approved by a majority of the appropriate
committee, it is again read on either the Assembly or Senate floor.77
Bill analyses are prepared, and then the bill is read for a third time on
the floor. 8 Most bills need to be passed by a simple majority of either
house (twenty-one votes in the Senate or forty-one votes in the
Assembly), but bills which require an appropriation require a two-
thirds vote-twenty-seven votes in the forty-person Senate and fifty-
four votes in the eighty-person Assembly.79 An author of a bill which
is defeated on her house floor may ask for reconsideration and
another vote.8°
68. State of California, Legislative Counsel, Overview of Legislative Process,











79. Id. In Congress, by contrast, bills pass by a majority of those voting (as long as
there is a quorum).
80. State of California, Legislative Counsel, supra note 68.
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If a bill is passed by the house of the author of the bill, the entire
process is then repeated in the other legislative house."1 If the second
house amends the bill, it goes back to the house of origin to ensure
that that house agrees with the amendments." If the house of origin
does not agree to the amendments, the bill is referred to a two house
conference committee to resolve the differences, and the bill is then
put to another vote by both houses."
Once both houses approve a bill, the Governor can then sign the
bill into law, allow it to become law without his signature, or veto the
bill.' If the Governor does veto the bill, that veto can be overridden
by a two-thirds vote of each house.85
Hence, the legislative process ideally provides for careful
consideration of proposals, thoughtful amendments, and productive
compromise. However, in reality, the legislative process is clearly far
from ideal. That process is plagued by closed door sessions, last
minute decisions, and waiver of procedural rules that make the
process far from ideal.'
2. The Initiative Process
Initiative proponents write the text of the proposed initiatives.
Initiative proponents have total control over the drafting of their
proposed measures and need not obtain the opinions of opponents. 8
However, in practice, private compromises are likely necessary to
obtain support for viable proposals. In addition, initiative proponents
have the option of obtaining advice from the Legislative Counsel's




84. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
85. Id. See also State of California, Legislative Counsel, supra note 68.
86. See, e.g., McGreevy, supra note 63 ("After a half-hour of acrimonious exchanges,
Democrats voted en masse for the tax study and Republicans, suspicious that it is the first
step toward actually imposing the tax, voted as a bloc against the measure."). See also
Editorial, supra note 63; Boxall, supra note 63.
87. California Secretary of State's Office, How to Qualify an Initiative, http://www.
sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative/htm (last visited March
25, 2010).
88. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 10243 (2009); see also California Secretary of State's Office,
supra note 87.
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Initiative proponents submit a draft of the proposed measure to
the Attorney General. 89 The Attorney General then provides a ballot
title and summary within fifteen days,9° unless a fiscal analysis is
required, in which case the Department of Finance and the Joint
Legislative Budget Committee first perform a fiscal analysis within
twenty-five days from the date of receipt of the proposed initiative
measure.9' When the ballot title and summary, which may include a
fiscal analysis, is complete, the Attorney General sends it to the
proponents, the Senate, the Assembly, and the Secretary of State.'
Once an initiative is titled by the Attorney General and sent to the
Secretary of State's office, it is not longer amendable. 93
At this point proponents can begin circulating the initiatives for
signatures. Initiative proponents have 150 days from the date they
are given the official summary to obtain a sufficient number of
signatures to have the initiative placed on the ballot.94  For
constitutional amendments, proponents must gather signatures
amounting to eight percent of the Californians who voted in the most
recent gubernatorial election (about 695,000 people), and for
statutory amendments, proponents must gather signatures equaling
five percent of that group (about 433,000 people).95 If enough
signatures are gathered, the initiative is placed on the next statewide
election ballot, as long as that election is not sooner than 131 days
after the initiative qualifies for the ballot.'
While voters in California have at least 131 days to review
initiatives, and the legislature sometimes has only a few days, the
legislative process is designed to allow for more deliberation and
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9002 (2009); see also California Secretary of State's Office,
supra note 87.
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9004 (2009); see also California Secretary of State's Office,
supra note 87.
91. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9005 (2009); California Secretary of State's Office, supra
note 87.
92. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 336, 9007 (2009); see also California Secretary of State's
Office, supra note 87.
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 336, 9007; see also California Secretary of State's Office,
supra note 87; see also Miller, supra note 24, at 1051-52.
94. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 336; see also California Secretary of State's Office, supra
note 87.
95. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9035 (2009).
96. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9013 (2009); California Secretary of
State's Office, supra note 87.
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compromise than the initiative process." In addition, in the legislative
process, the governor has the ability to veto bills, and then the
legislature has the power to override that veto. 98
The initiative process is lacking in the deliberative aspects of
legislative lawmaking-"committee study, consultation, debate,
compromise, and passage by more than one institution. "9 Unlike
many other states which have the initiative process, in California,
there is no required formal review of the substance or legality of
initiatives. Proponents can draft, qualify, and circulate initiatives
without meaningful public hearing. At least one critic of the
initiative process describes it as "undisciplined by the limits of
negotiation, bargaining, and mutual accommodation that characterize
representative legislative bodies throughout the world."'' Initiative
proponents are not forced to compromise or build consensus around
their proposals the same way the legislative proponents of bills are.' °2
The voters may be left with nothing to do except watch thirty-second
television advertisements and vote "yes" or "no.
103
We believe that most initiatives which qualify for the ballot are
drafted by expert legislative drafters. For instance, an organization
called California Forward is now circulating measures to reform the
budget process."M  California Forward's experts include former
Assembly Speaker Bob Hertzberg, the co-chair of the organization,"0
Fred Silva, a former legislative staffer who has worked on developing
97. In the legislature there are thousands of bills. A legislator can present any idea
she wants and be all but assured that it will likely be heard in committee.
98. CAL. CONST. art IV, § 10.
99. Linde, supra note 34, at 1739; see generally Miller, supra note 24, at 1051.
100. See generally CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 15.
101. Lunch, supra note 36, at 672.
102. Staszewski, supra note 56, at 447-48 ("[T]here are currently no formal
mechanisms for requiring the initiative proponents to communicate with interested parties
to exchange ideas and make compromises during ballot campaigns.").
103. Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions
in State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 982-83 (2003) (arguing that because of the
way the initiative process is structured, and the lack of compromise and negotiation
inherent in the process, "a proposed initiative represents the most extreme form of law
which is considered politically expedient" (quoting Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 292
(Cal. 1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting))); see generally Miller, supra note 24, at 1052.
104. California Secretary of State's Office, Initiatives and Referenda Cleared for
Circulation, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/cleared-for-circulation.htm#
1445 (last visited March 25, 2010); Best Practices Budget Accountability Act, available at
http://www.cafwd-action.org/pdf[Initiative-Best-Practices-Budget-Accountability.pdf.
105. California Forward, Press Release (Mar. 11. 2009), available at http://www.ca
forward.org/files/HertzbergPressRelease.pdf.
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public policy for four decades,"' and Jim Mayer, former Executive
Director "of the Little Hoover Commission, an independent and
bipartisan state panel that reviews state programs and policies for
efficiency and effectiveness.' 7
Few things are ideal, including the initiative process. Voters,
who lack specialized experience in drafting legislation, are asked to
perform heavy lifting when it comes to initiatives. Indeed, the
initiative process places voters on a stand above the legislature-
while the people can trump legislative measures, it is difficult, if not
impossible for legislative measures to override initiatives. Even a
competent voter may be at a disadvantage as compared to a
legislator.
B. Voter Competence
The ability of the voters to make educated and informed
decisions at the ballot box is the subject of ongoing debate, and is an
issue when the electorate votes on both legislative measures and
initiatives. However, it arguably is of increased importance with
respect to the initiative process, where measures have not been
filtered through and examined by our elected representatives. 10
Studies have shown that many voters are ignorant about the
substance and consequences of many ballot measures. ° Voters may
106. California Forward, Fred Silva, available at http://www.caforward.org/
index.cfm/about/staff/fred-silva.
107. California Forward, James P. Mayer, available at http://www.caforward.org/
index.cfmlabout/staff/james-p-mayer.
108. See generally ARTHUR LUPIA AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1998).
109. In addition, it is important to remember that the legislature is far from infallible.
In 1996, both houses of the legislature passed, and Governor Pete Wilson signed an energy
deregulation bill, Assembly Bill 1890. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
CALIFORNIA ELECTRIC ENERGY CRISIS - PROVISIONS OF AB 1890, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/california/assemblybill.html. By 1999, electricity
costs were skyrocketing. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SUBSEQUENT
EVENTS - CALIFORNIA ELECTRIC ENERGY CRISIS, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaflelectricity/california/subsequentevents.html. By 2000, California was experiencing
severe blackouts. Id.
110. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and 'Disclosure Plus,' 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1143
(2003) ("Voters do not know basic facts about ballot measures, seem confused about the
issues, and appear unduly influenced by superficial advertising."); see also Paula Abrams,
The Majority Will: A Case Study of Misinformation, Manipulation, and the Oregon
Initiative Process, 87 OR. L. REV. 1025, 1052 (2008); see also, Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters,
Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, 86 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 390-402 (1992)
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lack the ability, education, or time to full understand ballot measures.
Also, voters may be simply apathetic.
Critics of ballot box budgeting claim that the process is untenable
because voters are not capable of making the complex decisions
asked of them at the ballot box. The fear of some, bluntly stated, is
that "[v]oters are uninformed, manipulated by slanted television ads,
and rarely determine the agenda on which they vote."''.
These critics contend that even highly sophisticated voters lack
important knowledge about the substance of ballot measures and of
the identity of many who endorse and oppose those measures."'
Voters may also be confused or do not understand ballot measure
language. Measures are sometimes phrased in the negative, or in a
counterintuitive fashion, such that voters are asked to vote "no" to
keep a program or allow for the exercise of a right.113 Research has
also demonstrated that nearly thirty percent of voters first encounter
ballot measures in the voting booth.'14 Uninformed voters may decide
to approve or disapprove of ballot measures on the basis of little
more than the title of the proposal."5
However, there is evidence to suggest that voters may be able to
pick up on cues like endorsements and monetary support when voting
on ballot measures."6 Even though voters may not be knowledgeable
about content of ballot measures, the electorate may be able to use
shortcuts to vote their interests."7  For instance, in some cases,
knowledge about those who support or oppose a measure can provide
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-lupia/Papers/Lupial992-BusyVoters.pdf
("When information cues increase the likelihood that incompletely informed voters
emulate the behavior of informed voters, the probability that the complete information
majority preferred alternative (CIMPA) is the direct legislation outcome increases.").
111. O'Leary, supra note 36, at 1492
112. Gastil et al., supra note 61, at 1459.
113. Id. at 1442.
114. Lunch, supra note 36, at 669-70.
115. Fino, supra note 103, at 980-81.
116. See Kang, supra note 110, at 1157 ("[V]oters can derive heuristic cues by looking
to which interest groups support and oppose a particular ballot measure .... In fact, the
positions taken by interest groups are particularly informative and consistent because
interest groups adhere to natural policy orientations dictated by the defining interests of
their memberships."); see also Glenn C. Smith, Solving the 'Initiatory Construction' Puzzle
(and Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 257, 265 (2007) ("At most, voters accurately read 'heuristic' cues, such as
the positions of interest groups, political parties, or individual political officials and
develop a 'general' or 'rough' sense of what an initiative seeks to do.").
117. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 57 ("While voters are ignorant about the substance
of ballot measures, they are surprisingly adept at voting their interests.").
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valuable information about who would benefit or be harmed by the
passage of that measure and its impact on the governmental process.
It should be noted, however, that ballot measures lack the cues
associated with candidates like party affiliation, personal history, and
in the case of incumbents, voting records."8
In addition, at least one prominent initiative scholar has argued
that the initiative process itself may lead to a more educated and
informed citizenry by elevating the public debate and motivating
citizens to go to the polls."9 Even unwise initiative proposals could
lead to productive debate among the electorate. This in and of itself
would arguably be a positive development. On the other hand, as it
currently stands, the electorate does not engage in daily debates
about ballot initiatives. This is to be expected. It is not the public's
job to make legislative decisions; that is the charge of our elected
officials.
It is worth noting that few initiatives that are passed are reversed
by the people.12" ' This could indicate that generally speaking, the
people do not regret decisions they make at the ballot box concerning
initiatives. Hence, while the people may not make wise decisions, one
could argue that they have not been fooled or duped at the ballot box
when they vote yes. It is of course very difficult to know whether the
voters are satisfied with their decisions, or if they do not fully
appreciate the consequences of those decisions. This could be true of
both initiatives and legislative measures.
C. The Influence of Special Interests
1. The Initiative Process
Money plays too important a role in both the initiative and
legislative processes. While the initiative process was created in
118. See Kang, supra note 110, at 1153 ("The trouble in direct democracy is that
heuristic cues like party identification and candidate characteristics are unavailable and
cannot help voters to overcome their political ignorance."); see id. at 1157 ("In the absence
of politician and party involvement, where can voters find reliable heuristic cues in issue
elections?").
119. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 57; see also DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J.
TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON
CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 252 (2004).
120. Gastil et al., supra note 61, at 1443, 1446; see also Hoesly, supra note 34, at 1203
("interest groups regularly take advantage of them to enact pet laws without meaningful
debate").
121. See generally California Secretary of State's Office, available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections (containing information on successful ballot initiatives).
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California as a way to reduce the influence of special interests on the
legislature, some believe that the initiative process has been hijacked
by the very interests the process was created to guard against. 22 It is
hardly startling to say the initiatives represent the interests of those
who place those measures on the ballot. It may, however, be that
those interests also coincide with the interests of the voting public.
John G. Matsusaka has performed empirical studies surrounding
the affect of initiatives. He has found that in states which have the
initiative process, special interests groups are less likely to implement
their agendas. His research suggests that the initiative process serves
the function it was designed to serve, a counterbalance to the
representative process which is sometimes too susceptible to
campaign contributors and/or lobbyists.123 Matsusaka has found that
while special interests have a greater influence over the initiative
process than the average person, by providing an alternative means of
lawmaking, the initiative process gives civic organizations a
mechanism to counterbalance the power that lobbyists have over the
legislature."'
Critics, however, contend that direct democracy now only serves
the narrow economic interests of well-funded special interest groups
or wealthy individuals, who can determine which measures will
appear on the ballot.' 25  Given our current legal framework, which
prevents prohibitions on paid signature gatherers, 26 a wealthy
individual or a small but well-funded group has the power to obtain
enough signatures to place a measure on the ballot, and help to shape
the political agenda. 27 Simply stated, with enough money, anyone can
get anything on the ballot. This means that when it comes to
initiatives on the ballot, the public generally votes on a few issues put
forth by people or groups with a certain level of funding or influence,
or on proposals which have garnered little opposition. As prominent
122. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 56. See also Hoesly, supra note 34, at 1191; Fino,
supra note 103, at 981.
123. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 57.
124. Id.
125. Lunch, supra note 36, at 664 ("So as a practical matter, assuming an interest group
(or, for that matter, a wealthy individual) has the money to pay for sufficient signatures,
there is literally nothing that cannot be qualified for the ballot, no matter how poorly
drafted, bizarre, or destructive."); O'Leary, supra note 36, at 1492 ("[p]owerful interest
groups and paid signature gatherers drive the process"); see generally Kang, supra note 45,
at 218.
126. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
127. Robinson, supra note 27, at 519; see also Garrett, supra note 40, at 257.
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legal scholar Beth Garrett has stated, "the sure route to ballot access
is money.
While money can all but ensure than a proposed measures is put
on the ballot, it by no means guarantees its success. 2 1 Spending in
opposition to a measure is more effective than spending in favor of a
measure.13 ° Special interests therefore also play a significant role in
defeating initiatives. Hence while money can determine what we vote
on, it does not determine which measures become laws.
2. The Legislative Process
The influence of special interests over legislators is an often
debated topic. Not only do large campaign contributions pose the
risk for actual or apparent corruption, but gifts from lobbyists to
legislators do the same. In 2009, in the middle of the budget process,
AT&T spent $1,800 to send eighteen legislators, their staffers and
their children to "Disney's High School Musical: The Ice Tour.'
31
This is but one example of a trend of lobbyists providing gifts and
perks to legislators, clearly in hopes of currying favor. In 2009, the
Sacramento Bee found that in the eighteen months including all of
2008 and the first part of 2009, "California's legislators and leaders
ate about 8,000 free meals, pocketed about 2,000 free event tickets
and accepted enough flowers to open their own shop, all courtesy of
lobbyists.' 3 2 All told, the Sacramento Bee found that during that
period, lobbyists gave legislators, legislative staff, and the relatives of
legislators $610,000 in gifts.
3
Running for the California Senate or Assembly is an expensive
undertaking. The vast majority of donations are made to incumbents,
as opposed to challengers.' Quite obviously, it is incumbents who
can make legislative decisions which benefit campaign contributors.
With respect to campaign contributions, in 2008, the total raised by
candidates for the Assembly was $84.4 million. The average raised by
128. Garrett, supra note 40, at 257.
129. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 57; see also Garrett, supra note 21, at 241.
130. Matsusaka, supra note 17, at 57.
131. Philip Reese, Amid budget crisis, California legislators still wined and dined on




134. National Institute on Money in State Politics, http://www.followthemoney.org
(last visited March 25, 2010).
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an incumbent candidate for the Assembly was $681,936, while the
average raised by a challenger was $20,409. The total raised by
candidates for the Senate was $35.2 million. For candidates for the
Senate, each incumbent raised an average of $788,754, while each
challenger raised an average of $65,210.135
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the link between
contributions and gifts by special interests to legislators and the
voting records of those legislators. However, that large contributors
and special interests have more access to and influence over
legislators than members of the non-donor public seems obvious.
13 6
D. Issues Surrounding Voter Turn Out
Also it is an obvious fact of life, the fact bears repeating that not
all eligible voters participate in elections.'37 Quite obviously, decisions
about candidates, legislative measures, and initiatives are made only
by those voters who show up at the voting booth on Election Day.38
Therefore, ballot box decisions may represent "the action of a
majority of a numerical minority of voters."'3 9 The question, which
this article does not seek to answer, is whether those voters represent
the public at large.
That the voters who come to the ballot box on Election Day
make policy decisions for the entire state is the case when it comes to
all ballot measures, but there are some differences between initiatives
and legislative measures in relation to voter turnout. When the
legislature puts a measure on the ballot, elected representatives have
discussed and passed that measure. In addition, members of the
voting public are not accountable to anyone but themselves, and
hence will rationally vote in what they believe to be their self-interest.
135. National Institute on Money in State Politics, Candidates, http://www.followthe
money.org/database/StateGlance/state-candidates.phtml?s=CA&y=2008 (last visited
March 25, 2010).
136. See Dorie Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption
Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 24-26 (2008).
137. According to a poll taken after the 2008 Presidential Election, "[s]tate agencies
estimate that the state's population stands at about 38 million, of whom about 23 million
are citizens and eligible to vote, and 17.3 million are registered. All are record highs. If
13.6 million votes are indeed cast in today's statewide election, it would represent a
turnout of 78.9% of registered voters and a participation rate of 58.8% of citizens eligible
to vote. The former would be the highest turnout rate in thirty-two years, while the latter
would be the highest participation rate since 1972." The Field Poll, http://www.field.com/
fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2294.pdf.
138. Linde, supra note 34, at 1741.
139. Robinson, supra note 27, at 518.
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However, legislators are accountable to their constituents. Whether
legislators take this responsibility seriously is an entirely different
matter.
On the other hand, the initiative process allows the public to
enact laws which the legislature may be unwilling or unable to pass.
For instance, the legislature is not likely to pass reforms which
interfere with their ability to raise money, such as campaign finance
reforms, or reforms which take away their ability to draw their own
district boundaries, like the recently-passed redistricting law. In
addition, when the legislature refused to do so, the people by
initiative passed a drug diversion program which reduced prison
costs.
14°
E. A Piecemeal Approach to Budgeting
Ballot box budgeting, whether accomplished by legislative
measures which have first been passed by elected officials or by the
initiative process, allows the voters to have a voice in budgetary
policy, but permits considerations of proposed measures in isolation
only, and only on a piecemeal basis.
The biggest problem with ballot box budgeting is that voters do
not have a complete view of the budget when deciding important
issues which will affect the budget. Ballot box budgeting by
definition, does not allow for a comprehensive approach to the
budgeting process, and arguably "cannot be informed by a coherent
tax or fiscal policy.' 41 Legislative measures and initiatives that affect
the budget process do so only on an ad hoc basis. Voters are
presented with one issue at a time, and it may be difficult for voters to
appropriately consider the pros and cons of any single measure in the
larger context of the state's budget.142 In addition, voters face a binary
choice, they may vote only "yes" or "no" on a proposed measure,
there is no room for compromise or alternative proposals in light of
other considerations. 143 The single subject rule (which limits measures
140. In 2000, voters passed Proposition 36 which mandates that drug offenders
treatment programs instead of jail. California Secretary of State's Office, 2000 Ballot
Measures, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections//electionsbm.htm (last visited March 25, 2010).
See also California Secretary of State's Office, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
inithistory.pdf (containing a chart listing the voter percentages of ninety-nine ballot
initiatives that were approved between 1914 and 2002).
141. Robinson, supra note 27, at 518.
142. Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096, 1118 (2005).
143. Garrett, supra note 40, at 251; see also Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse Than the
Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions in State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 981
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to only one subject) also limits the ability of the voters to consider
comprehensive reform proposals."
Voters may approve ballot measures which cut taxes and call for
the creation or enlargement of government programs.145 There may
be an "inherent contradiction" in these two types of initiatives)6
Voters may not understand the connection between taxes or fees and
services."' Voters, for instance, may not fully comprehend that their
choices will affect the availability of services for programs not
mentioned in the initiative or the initiative campaign.4 8 Voters may
want both more services and lower taxes.49  "Americans' reservations
about taxes are paradoxically coupled with an enthusiasm for
spending."'' 0 It is difficult for voters voting on tax and spending
measures in different initiatives, and likely in different elections, to
take into consideration the need for a balanced budget. 5' Voters
need not be concerned with how those measures will be implemented.
Voters only make a binary choice of approving or disproving a
measure. Because of this, the ability of initiatives to affect the budget
has led some to write about the "piecemeal destruction of state fiscal
systems by initiative measures. '
F. A Cycle of Discontent
Budget measures can lead to a cycle of voter discontent. Voters
may approve of a measure that lowers property taxes, such as
Proposition 13, in one election. As a result of that ballot measure,
there may be less funding available for other public programs which
are highly valued by voters, such as education. Now discontented,
voters may pass a measure mandating that a certain amount of
funding be allocated to their favorite programs, as voters did in 1988
(2003) ("Propositions are placed before the people in a 'take it or leave it' fashion, with no
room for discussion, or modification, or accommodation as in a legislature.").
144. Garrett, supra note 40, at 251.
145. Lunch, supra note 36, at 663.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 670.
148. Id. at 670-71.
149. Fino, supra note 143, at 985 (citing Susan Welch, The 'More for Less' Paradox:
Public Attitudes on Taxing and Spending, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 310 (1985)).
150. Fino, supra note 143, at 985.
151. Linde, supra note 34, at 1756.
152. Id.
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when they passed Proposition 98.153 This cycle breeds voter
dissatisfaction and puts a rising percentage of the state's budget off-
limits to the legislature. Having tied the hands of the legislature,
voters then feel the need to circumvent the legislature and do what
the legislature may have in fact done on its own: provide funding for
certain favored programs. As Garrett has stated, "The relationship
between direct democracy and traditional representative institutions
is circular-each reacts to the other.'
'154
G. Implementation Issues
Even when voters pass a measure at the ballot box, there is no
guarantee that it will be implemented. In California today, almost
half of the General Fund bonds that have been authorized remain
unissued. As of October 1, 2009, California had $66.5 billion of
outstanding General Fund debt and $64 billion of authorized and
unissued General Fund bonds.155  Additionally, constitutional
challenges delay the implementation of ballot measures-even those
that are ultimately upheld by courts.
H. The Effects of Ballot Box Budgeting on the Budget Process
There is no doubt that ballot box budgeting has deeply affected
California's fiscal affairs. Californians have passed initiatives that
affect every element of the budget process-from cutting taxes, 156 to
153. "Initiatives constrain lawmakers as they budget, a situation that, in turn, forces
groups to turn to initiatives to enact taxes and other revenue raises earmarked for
particular programs. Moreover, the entire cycle may have been started by voters'
perception that their representatives were irresponsible with the public's money and more
accountable to special interests than the public interest. In response, the public may have
voted for initiatives that reduced the lawmakers' power over budgeting." Garrett, supra
note 142, at 1129.
154. Garrett, supra note 21, at 278; see also Wesley Hussey, Direct Democracy in
California, 7 ELECTION L.J. 256, 257 (2008) ("The more citizens interfere by passing
initiatives, the more difficult it is for their legislators to govern, increasing the desire to of
citizens to pass another initiative that will fix the new problem.").
155. Memorandum from Jason Dickerson, Director, State Administration, to
Members, Senate Natural Resources and Water Committee and Assembly Water, Parks,
and Wildlife Committee (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/
stadm/debtservice/DebtServiceInformationMemo10 30_09.pdf.
156. Proposition 6: Gift and Inheritance Taxes. Taxes. Repeal existing statues on Gift
and Inheritance Taxes. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide
24-27 (1982), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1982p.pdf; see also
Proposition 7: Income Tax Indexing. Tax Indexing. Annual adjustment of graduated state
personal income tax brackets. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information
Guide 28-31 (1982), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1982p.pdf; see
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requiring voter approval for new local taxes, 57 to earmarking funds
for certain programs, 58 to cutting the legislature's budget, "9 to limiting
spending."6 Successful measures that create new programs and
require the floating of bonds have cost the state billions of dollars in
interest alone. 6' Measures that are not even seen as budget measures
have cost the state tremendous amounts of money. Two examples are
Proposition 21, which increased penalties for certain crimes, 162 and
Proposition 83, which increased penalties for sex crimes 63  The
following is an examination of the different areas of the budget that
have been affected by voters' decisions at the ballot box.
also Proposition 13: Tax Limitation. Taxes. Limitation on Property Taxes. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide 57-63 (1978),
available at http://Iibrary.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1978p.pdf.
157. Proposition 13: Tax Limitation. Taxes. Limitation on Property Taxes. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide 57-63 (1978),
available at http://ibrary.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1978p.pdf; see also Proposition 218:
Voter Approval for Local Government. Taxes. Limitation on Fees, Assessments and
Charges. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, published by the California Legislative
Analyst's Office (1996), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/1996/prop2l8_lll1996.html.
158. Proposition 10: State and County Early Childhood Development Programs.
Additional Tobacco Surtax. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted
in Official Voter Guide 44-49 (1998), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/
ballot.pdf/1998g.pdf; see also Proposition 37: State Lottery. Initiative Constitutional
Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 46-49 (1984), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.eduballot-pdf/1984g.pdf; see also Proposition 98: School
Funding. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter
Information Guide 79-82 (1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/
1988g.pdf; see also Proposition 99: Cigarette and Tobacco Tax. Benefit Fund. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide
82-85 (1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1988g.pdf.
159. Proposition 140: Limits on Terms of Office, Legislators' Retirement, Legislative
Operating Costs. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Guide
68-71 (1990), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf1990g.pdf.
160. Miller, supra note 24, at 1055; see also Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress: The
Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 29 (2003-2004)
("For more than twenty-five years, government and politics in California, our largest state,
have been strongly shaped by voter initiatives, which have curbed taxes, changed the
procedures for adopting new taxes, mandated new expenses, imposed term limits, and
addressed campaign finance laws.").
161. Dickerson, supra note 155.
162. Proposition 21: Juvenile Crime. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter
Guide 44-49 (2000), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edulballotpdf2OOOp.pdf.
163. Proposition 83: Sex Offenders. Sexually Violent Predators. Punishment,
Residence Restrictions and Monitoring. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter
Guide 42-46 (2006), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2006g.pdf.
IV. The Effects of Ballot Box Budgeting
A. An Overview of Measures Affecting Taxes
From 1988 to 2008, there were three successful initiatives and
two successful legislative measures that called for higher taxes.
Significantly, all of the successful measures in both categories
earmarked the increased revenue to fund a specific type of program.64
The three successful initiatives were Propositions 99 (1988),165 10
(1998),' 6 and 63 (2004).67 Proposition 99 increased the tax on
cigarettes to fund environmental, health care, and anti-tobacco
programs. 68 Proposition 10 increased the tax on cigarettes to fund
early childhood development programs. 169 Proposition 63 increased
the tax on individuals making over $1 million per year to fund mental
health services.7 Because the revenue raised by each initiative was
earmarked for a specific purpose, the increased taxes did not increase
revenue for the general fund.
The two successful legislative measures that increased taxes were
Proposition 111 in 1990171 and Proposition 172 in 1993.72 Proposition
164. Data compiled by authors from the California Secretary of State's Office,
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections.
165. Proposition 99: Cigarette and Tobacco Tax. Benefit Fund. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide 82-
85 (1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.eduballot-pdf/1988g.pdf.
166. Proposition 10: State and County Early Childhood Development Programs.
Additional Tobacco Surtax. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted
in Official Voter Guide 44-49 (1998), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/
1998g.pdf.
167. Proposition 63: Mental Health Services Expansion Funding. Tax on Personal
Incomes Above $1 Million. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide (2004),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/2004g.pdf.
168. Proposition 99: Cigarette and Tobacco Tax. Benefit Fund. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide 82-
85 (1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1988g.pdf.
169. Proposition 10: State and County Early Childhood Development Programs.
Additional Tobacco Surtax. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted
in Official Voter Guide 44-49 (1998), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/
1998g.pdf.
170. Proposition 63: Mental Health Services Expansion Funding. Tax on Personal
Incomes Above $1 Million. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide (2004),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2004g.pdf.
171. Proposition 111: The Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of
1990. Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 18-21
(1990), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1990p.pdf.
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111 increased taxes on gasoline to pay for traffic congestion relief."'
Proposition 172 increased the sales tax to pay for public safety
protection.174
From 1988 to 2008, only one initiative decreased the tax burden
on Californians: 1992's Proposition 163, which exempted certain food
products from a sales tax.
75
B. Propositions 13,62, and 218
The passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 was a watershed moment
in California politics and highlighted the importance of the initiative
process. 76  Proposition 13 amended the state constitution to fix
assessed property values at 1975-76 levels, limit property tax rates to
one percent of assessed value, and limit assessment increases on
properties purchased before 1978 to two percent per year unless the
property is sold. 77 Proposition 13 underscored the trend of ballot box
budgeting in California178 and ushered in the so-called "tax revolt.'
' 79
By lowering property taxes and limiting the amount by which
they could increase in any year, Proposition 13 limited the resources
available to the state and made local jurisdictions more dependent on
the state for funds.'O Proposition 13 gave the state legislature the
power to allocate property tax revenue among local jurisdictions." '
This placed a substantial fiscal constraint on local governments that
172. Proposition 172: Local Public Safety Protection and Improvement Act of 1993.
Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 24-27 (1993),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1993s.pdf.
173. Proposition 111: The Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of
1990. Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 18-21
(1990), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/1990p.pdf.
174. Proposition 172: Local Public Safety Protection and Improvement Act of 1993.
Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 24-27 (1993),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1993s.pdf.
175. Proposition 163: Ends Taxation of Certain Food Products. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 40-41 (1992),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1992g.pdf.
176. Hoesly, supra note 34, at 1196; see also Frickey, supra note 40, at 421
177. Proposition 13: Tax Limitation. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted
in Official Voter Guide 56-60 (1978), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/
1978p.pdf.
178. Lunch, supra note 36, at 664.
179. Dempsey, supra note 22, at 130 ("Proposition 13 capitalized on an anti-tax
backlash among homeowners angered by skyrocketing property taxes.").
180. Garrett, supra note 22, at 276-77.
181. Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 191,198 (2001).
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had historically relied on local property tax revenues.'2 Proposition
13 reduced the revenue available to local governments to fund local
public services like education.183 Critics have charged that Proposition
13 "left education, welfare, public safety, the economy, and the
infrastructure in shambles."'"
Proposition 13 also mandated that any state tax increases be
passed by two-thirds of each legislative house and that any local
''special" tax increases be passed by a two-thirds vote of the
electorate.'85  Proposition 13 made it even more difficult for
California's legislature to raise taxes and agree on a budget.'
6
Because Proposition 13 is a constitutional amendment, it can be
amended only by another initiative, or a vote of both of the both
legislative houses which is later put to a vote of the people.'
8
Propositions 62 and 218, enacted after Proposition 13, closed
loopholes left open by Proposition 13 by requiring a popular vote for
the passage of new local taxes. Proposition 62, passed in 1986, was a
statutory provision that restated the requirement that "special" taxes
be passed by a two-thirds vote, and requires local legislative bodies to
put general tax increases on the ballot only by a two-thirds vote of
their members at a public hearing. Those general taxes must also be
approved by a two-thirds vote of the people." Proposition 218, a
constitutional amendment passed by the voters in 1996, requires that
a majority of property owners approve local property tax increases
182. Id. at 199
183. Lunch, supra note 36, at 666.
184. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733 (1994).
185. In 2000, voters passed Proposition 39, which allows for the passage of school
construction bonds by a 55% vote, rather than a two-thirds vote. In addition, the two-
thirds requirement imposed by Proposition 13 does not apply to fee increases.
Information from the University of California, Hastings College of Law, Hastings Law
Library, available at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/15722/calprop.txt.
186. Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy as 'Super-Precedent'?: Political Constraints of
Citizen Initiatived Laws, 43 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 191, 216 (2007). Garrett has criticized
the two-thirds requirement for raising taxes stating that while the initiative process can
serve many important functions, it has also led to "changes in democratic institutions that
I believe have been unwise, such as .. . limitations on the ability of legislatures to raise
taxes." Garrett, supra note 40, at 247.
187. CAL. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1, 3.
188. Proposition 62: Taxation. Local Governments and Districts. Initiative Statute,
reprinted in Official Voter Guide 40-43 (1986), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edul
ballot-pdf/l986g.pdf.
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and that local general taxes be approved by two-thirds of the local
electorate.'89
The propriety of Proposition 62 and 218's requirements that
changes in local tax burdens be put to a popular vote is not clear. On
the one hand, this requirement asks the voters to make a fiscal
decision in isolation, based on an issue that is multifaceted. Voters
are simply asked whether to increase their own tax burden and may
not fully understand the costs and benefits of the decision. On the
other hand, the requirement of putting local tax changes to a vote of
the people adds legitimacy to legislators' decisions by ensuring that
the legislation enjoys popular support." Further, the right to vote on
taxes could stimulate greater public debate about the allocation of
local taxes and increased taxpayer consensus about local fiscal
decisions. 9'
C. Budget Allocation
As a result of Proposition 13's depletion of educational funding,
California voters passed Proposition 98 in 1988, which mandates that
approximately forty percent of the budget be dedicated to K-12 and
community college education.'92  Proposition 98 requires that
189. Proposition 218: Voter Approval for Local Government. Taxes. Limitation on
Fees, Assessments and Charges. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, published by the
California Legislative Analyst's Office (1996), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/
1996/prop21811_1996.html; ANALYSIS BY THE SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE, THE GUARDINO DECISION AND LOCAL TAX VALIDATION, available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1351-
1400/ab_1362_cfa_19970711_162210_sen comm.html. In addition, from 1986 to 1996,
there were twenty-two ballot measures on the subject of taxes: twelve legislative measures
and ten initiatives. Nine of the twelve legislative measures passed, and three of the ten
initiatives were successful. From 1998 to 2009, when Propositions 13, 62, and 218 were all
in place, there were twelve ballot measures regarding taxes: one legislative measure and
eleven initiatives. The legislative measure passed along with four out of eleven initiatives.
In all, there were a total of half as many legislative measures dealing with taxes after these
three propositions were in place as there had been in the pre-1986 period. This statistic
demonstrates that the legislature represented the anti-tax sentiments of the people. Data
compiled from information available at the California Secretary of State's Office website,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections.
190. Stark, supra note 181, at 207, 233. However, Professor Kirk J. Stark has argued
that because of a number of features of local tax structure, including that fact that
nonresidential property is included in the local property tax base and taxes of income are
based on source not residence, a local referendum does not measure taxpayer consent.
191. Id. at 237.
192. William M. Lunch has argued that this decrease in funding for education caused
by Proposition 13 led to "budgetary cannibalism" and the passage of Prop 98 in 1988.
Lunch, supra note 36, at 666.
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spending on education be at least equal to spending in the prior year.
Further, under Proposition 98 the state must spend at least half of any
budget surplus on education.19 It is important to understand that
Proposition 98 does not designate a new funding source for
education; instead it requires that when making the state's annual
budget, legislators dedicate a percentage of the budget for education.
Proposition 98 represents the worst example of ballot box
budgeting by initiative. Although the measure does allow legislators
some flexibility in changing economic times, Proposition 98 still
dictates that a certain percentage of the budget is off limits to the
legislature. Further, the measure's restrictions have created
budgetary problems each year since its enactment, forcing the
legislature to take complex funding formulas into account and making
the legislature jump through unnecessary hoops to accommodate its
provisions. 94
D. Direct Outlays
While the vast majority of initiatives that call for the creation or
enlargement of programs fund those services by issuing bonds, a few
measures call for direct outlays from the general fund without calling
for the floating of bonds. For instance, in 1990 voters passed
Proposition 117, an initiative which mandated that California spend at
least $30 million a year on wildlife and habitat protection.9 In 2002,
voters passed Proposition 49, an initiative sponsored by Arnold




Ballot measures can also affect the budget by calling for
programs funded by issuing bonds. (For a detailed chart of ballot
measures from 1988 to 2008 which call for the issuance of bonds,
please see Appendix 1.) While these measures are advertised as
193. California Department of Education, Text of Proposition 98, available at
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/sa/prop98.asp; Proposition 98: School Funding. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide
79-82 (1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1988g.pdf.
194. See generally Garrett, supra note 22, at 275.
195. Proposition 117: Wildlife Protection. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter
Guide 40-43 (1990), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1990p.pdf.
196. Proposition 49: Before and After School Programs. State Grants. Initiative
Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 18-24 (2002), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2002g.pdf.
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being possible without raising taxes, they do cost the state and its
taxpayers because the state must pay back the principal and the
interest on these bonds.
As of October 1, 2009, California had $130.5 billion in authorized
General Fund debt; $66.5 billion of outstanding General Fund debt
and $64 billion of unissued, but authorized, General Fund bonds. 197
In 2009-10, California's debt-service payments on outstanding
General Fund debt are projected to be $5.75 billion.19" When the state
issues additional bonds already authorized by the voters, the debt-
service obligations from the General Fund will be even higher. The
California Treasurer's Office has estimated that the General Fund
debt service will hit a peak of $9.75 billion in 2017-18."9
The Treasurer's Office has estimated that in 2009-10 the debt
service will consume 6.7% of the General Fund.2° It is further
projected the percentage of the General Fund consumed by debt
service will peak at just under 9% in 2013-14.21 These numbers do
not reflect the fact that voters will likely continue to approve bond
authorizations such that debt service may in reality constitute a much
larger percentage of the General Fund in the future.
How much have initiatives that call for the issuing of bonds cost
the state as compared to analogous legislative measures? Both
initiative and legislative measures enacting bonds from 1988 to 2008
will cost the state $273.5 billion: $143.05 billion in principal and
$130.45 billion in interest. From 1988 to 2008, there were seven
successful bond initiatives, and forty-five successful legislative bond
measures. Since 1988, successful initiatives that have called for the
floating of bonds will cost the state approximately $31.8 billion: $16.3
billion in principal and $15.5 billion in interest. The cost per year is
approximately $1.01 billion. Since 1988, successful legislative ballot
measures which have called for the issuing of bonds will cost the state
a total of $241.72 billion: $126.7 billion in principal and $115 billion in
interest. The cost per year is approximately $7.4 billion,
197. Dickerson, supra note 155. Specifically, California had $58.5 billion of General
Obligation debt which is expected to be paid from the General Fund. California also had
$53.2 billion of unissued by authorized General Obligation debt to be paid from the
General Fund. In addition, the state had $8 billion of outstanding lease revenue bond
debt ("LRB") to be paid from the General Fund, and $11 billion of unissued but






approximately seven times the cost per year of initiative bond
202measures.
F. Examples of Legislative Measures Calling for the Issuance of Bonds
The legislature was responsible for the passage of measures
which allowed for the issuance of the largest bonds in our state's
history. An unusual example of ballot box budgeting in recent years
occurred in 2004, when the legislature asked the public to approve
bonds to cure that year's deficit.0 3 Until then, bond measures had
been used for infrastructure, such as roads, water, education, and
housing. By asking the public to use a long term financing system for
a short term problem, the legislature (and the public when it
approved the bonds) asked future taxpayers to pay for that year's
deficit. Californians used bonds to go into debt in the same way that
the federal government engages in deficit spending. This bond
measure hurt the state's credit rating, pushed interest rates higher for
other bonds, and arguably set an example of deferring the problem of
the deficit. On the other hand, if the state's economy had improved
after 2004, this bond measure would have avoided painful cuts in
202. Data compiled by the authors. These calculations are based on estimates made by
the Legislative Analyst's Office and may not reflect actual costs because of changing
interest rates. We have based interest payments on projected selling and repayment of
bonds with fixed percentages over 20 to 30 years. None of these numbers have been
indexed for inflation. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS HISTORICAL DATA, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/LAOMenus/laomenu_
propositions historicaldata.aspx (last visited March 25, 2010).
203. In 2004, Californians passed Propositions 57 and 58. Proposition 57 allowed the
state to issue bonds of $15 billion to cover the state's deficit. Proposition 57 was
contingent on the passage of Proposition 58, which requires that the state pass a balanced
budget each year. California voter guide, http://primary2004.sos.ca.gov/propositionsl
propsummary.html (last visited March 25, 2010). Proposition 57: The Economic
Recovery Bond Act. Legislative Bond Measure, reprinted in Official Voter Guide
Supplement 4-10 (2004), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2004pu.pdf;
see also Proposition 58: The California Balanced Budget Act. Legislative Bond Measure,
reprinted in Official Voter Guide Supplement 10-16 (2004), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2004pu.pdf. See also Legislative Analyst's Office,
http:/llao.ca.govfballot/2004/57-03_2004.htm; Legislative Analyst's Office,
http://Iao.ca.gov/ballot/2004/58 03_2004.htm.
204. See OFFICE OF THE STATE TREASURER, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEBT
AFFORDABILITY REPORT (2005), available at http:/lwww.treasurer.ca.gov/publications/
2005dar.pdf. See also OFFICE OF THE STATE TREASURER, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEBT
AFFORDABILITY REPORT (2006), available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/publications/
2006dar.pdf. See also California State Treasurer, Public Finance Division - History of
General Obligations Credit Ratings, http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ratings/history.asp (last
visited Mar. 25, 2010).
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2004, and in any event spread the deficit over future years of
prosperity without the state having to cut funding in the short-term.
In 2006 California voters at the request of the legislature passed
Propositions 1B-1E which together authorized approximately $37
billion in general obligation bonds to cover costs of transportation,
education, resources and housing. The Legislative Analyst's Office
estimated that including interest, the cost of this bond package was
$72.9 billion.05
At the request of the legislature, Californians have also
repeatedly passed measures calling for the issuance of bonds to fund
public education facilities: Proposition 1A in 1998, which called for
the issuance of $9.2 billion in bonds, °6 Proposition 47 in 2002, which
called for the issuance of over $13 billion in bonds,2 7 and Proposition
55 in 2004, which called for the issuance of over $12 billion in bonds.08
G. Examples of Initiatives Calling for the Issuance of Bonds
Voters have passed a number of initiatives calling for the
issuance of bonds, costing the state billions of dollars to date. In 1990,
California voters passed Proposition 116, which called for the
issuance of $1.9 billion in bonds to pay for clean air and
transportation improvement. In 2002, California voters passed
Proposition 50, which called for the issuance of $3.4 billion in bonds
to pay for a variety of water projects. In 2004, California voters
passed Proposition 71, which allowed $3 billion in bonds to finance
stem cell research. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimated that
this initiative would cost the state approximately $6 billion over thirty
years, $3 billion to pay off the principal and $3 billion to pay off the
interest, with average state payments of $200 million per year °.2  In
205. Legislative Analyst's Office, Governor's Infrastructure Bond Proposal, ANALYSIS
OF THE 2008-09 BUDGET BILL, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis-2008/cap-
outlay/infra-an108002.aspx.
206. Proposition 1A: Class Size Reduction Kindergarten-University Public Education
Facilities Bond Act of 1998. Legislative Bond Measure, reprinted in Official Voter Guide
4-7 (1998), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edulballot-pdf/1998gu.pdf.
207. Proposition 47: Kindergarten-University Public Education Facilities Bond Act of
2002. Legislative Bond Measure, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 8-13 (2002), available
at http://traynor.uchastings.edulballot-pdf/2002g.pdf.
208. Proposition 55: Kindergarten-University Public Education Facilities Bond Act of
2004. Legislative Bond Measure, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 4-5 (2004), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2004p.pdf.
209. Proposition 71: Health Care Coverage Requirements. Referendum, reprinted in
Official Voter Guide 74-80 (2004), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/
[Vol. 37:4
BALLOT BOX BUDGETING IN CALIFORNIA
2006, voters passed Proposition 84, which called for the issuance of
210$5.4 billion in bonds to fund a safe drinking water program.
H. Criminal Law Issues: Proposition 184
Proposition 184, passed by voters in 1994, is the so-called three
strikes law.1 While this initiative was being circulated, the legislature
passed a similar measure. When voters passed the initiative, it
superseded the legislative measure.1 2 While Proposition 184 ties the
hands of the legislature and can only be amended by a vote of the
people, the legislature passed a similar bill that did not represent
ballot box budgeting. A discussion of ballot box budgeting may still
be enhanced by a brief overview of the three strikes law.
Proposition 184 lengthened prison terms for conviction based on
a number of crimes and required that certain criminals be imprisoned
for specified periods of time. Proposition 184 has required that the
state commit untold resources for criminal prosecutions and the
maintenance and construction of prisons. 23 The Legislative Analyst's
Office estimated that Proposition 184 would cost the state $20 billion
in prison construction costs and $6 billion annually.
214
Proposition 184 did not designate where the money to pay for
the implementation of the law would come from.21 ' As a result, those
funds were potentially taken out of projects "with more vulnerable
constituents less able to defend themselves by sponsoring initiatives
2004g.pdf; California Legislative Analyst's Office, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/
ballot/2004/71 11 2004.htm.
210. Proposition 84: Water Quality, Safety and Supply. Flood Control. Natural
Resources Protection. Park Improvements. Bonds. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official
Voter Guide 48-53 (2006), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2006g.pdf;
California Legislative Analyst's Office, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov.
211. California Legislative Analyst's Office, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3-
strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm.
212. John Borland, #184 Sentence Enhancement: Repeat Offenders, CAL. JOURNAL
(1994), reprinted in CAL. VOTER FOUND. (1994), available at http://calvoter.org/archive/94
general/props/184.html.
213. See generally BRIAN BROWN AND GREG JOLIVETTE, THE LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST'S OFFICE, A PRIMER: THREE STRIKES - THE IMPACT AFTER MORE THAN A
DECADE (2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm (last visited
March 25, 2010).
214. Garrett, supra note 21, at 275.
215. MARIANNE O'MALLEY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING
PROPOSITION 218 (1996), http://www.lao.ca.gov/1996/120196_prop-218/understanding-
prop2l8_1296.html#chapter2 (last visited March 25, 2010).
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of their own." '216 Although Proposition 184 was never debated as a
budget measure, it clearly has cost the state tens of billions of dollars.
In 2000, California voters passed Proposition 36, an initiative that
altered the three strikes law by mandating drug treatment instead of
life imprisonment for some individuals convicted of drug-related
crimes.217 In 2000, it was estimated that Proposition 36 would save the
state $100 million to $150 million per year and potentially avoid one-
time capital outlays of $450 million to $550 million.218
The three strikes law is not the only initiative dealing with
criminal law issues that has cost the state money. In 2000, voters
passed Proposition 21, which increased penalties for certain crimes,
costing the state money in terms of lengthier sentences for individuals
convicted of those crimes. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimated
that Proposition 21 would cost the state a one-time cost of about $750
million and an annual cost of more than $330 million. Further, the
Legislative Analyst's Office concluded that local governments would
face a potential one-time cost of $200 million to $300 million and
annual costs between the tens of millions to $100 million.
In 2006, voters approved Proposition 83, an initiative that
increased penalties for people convicted of certain sex crimes. This
initiative similarly cost the state money by increasing criminal
prosecutions and the prison population. Proposition 83 means the
state has incurred additional state parole costs, court costs, and jail
costs. The Legislative Analyst's Office could not estimate what
Proposition 83 would cost the state.22°
216. Lunch, supra note 36, at 666.
217. California Secretary of State, Proposition 36: Drugs. Probation and Treatment
Program. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide 22-27 (2000), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.eduballot-pdf/2000g.pdf.
218. Id.
219. See generally California Secretary of State's Office, available at
http://primary2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/21.htm.
220. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 83. SEX
OFFENDERS. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS. PUNISHMENT, RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
AND MONITORING. INITIATIVE STATUTE (2006), http://www.lao.ca.govballot2006/83 11
2006.htm (last visited March 25, 2010).
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I. Initiatives Directly Reducing the Legislature's Budget
In 1996, the voters passed Proposition 140, an initiative that
targeted the legislature and had an effect on the budget process.22'
Proposition 140 cut the legislature's budget by almost forty percent
and imposed term limits on legislators. Legislators were forced to
dramatically reduce their staffs. Arguably, term limits mean that
legislators are not able to build expertise in the budgeting process.
The Legislative Analyst's Office estimated that in 1991-92,
Proposition 140 would reduce legislative expenditures by about
thirty-eight, or $70 million.223  This type of direct initiative is yet
another effect of the ballot box on the budget process.224
V. Two Proposed Reforms for Ballot Box Budgeting
A. Require Proposed Initiatives to Identify Their Funding Source(s)
Ballot box budgeting can create costly programs without regard
to how those programs will be funded, can cut revenue without
designating which program(s) will be cut, and can call for the issuance
of bonds without identifying how those bonds will be repaid. Because
the biggest problem surrounding ballot box budgeting is that voters
do not readily see the consequences of their decisions to cut revenue
or increases services, we suggest the following requirements: (1)
measures that create programs must identify the funding source for
that program; (2) measures that reduce revenue must identify which
program(s) will be cut; and (3) measures that call for the issuing of
bonds must specify how it will be paid back in the short term, perhaps
the first five years after the issuance. Instead of merely voting for a
program, these reforms would require voters to decide whether that
program was worth funding based on how other programs would be
affected. It would also mean that the legislature would not have to
find funding sources by increasing taxes, imposing fees, and/or cutting
popular programs in order to implement measures calling for the
creation of programs.225 Similarly, voters would have to decide not
merely whether to reduce state funds, but also whether to reduce
221. Proposition 140: Limits on Terms of Office, Legislators' Retirement, Legislative
Operating Costs. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in Official Voter Guide
68-71 (1990), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1990g.pdf.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See generally Garrett, supra note 40, at 248.
225. See generally Hoesly, supra note 34, at 1237.
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those funds knowing the consequences of that reduction. Finally,
when voting on bond measures, the voters would know how those
bonds would be repaid in the short term.226
Another option would be to require that all revenue-reducing
initiative measures automatically lead to a pro rata reduction of a
small percentage of all budget items. California would not be alone
in imposing this restriction: about forty percent of the states that have
the initiative process limit or ban initiatives that affect taxes and
appropriations.227 In addition, there is already precedent in California
for requiring initiatives to identify their funding source. In 2004,
California voters passed Proposition 63, which provides for mental
health services funded by a tax of an additional one percent on
taxable personal income over $1 million.2' Garrett has pointed out
that "[t]he success of Proposition 63 demonstrates that voters are
willing to support higher taxes-as long as they only apply to a small
handful of the very wealthy and the proceeds are earmarked for
popular programs., 29  In addition, voters have not only approved
taxes that target the wealthy, but also those that target "bad
behavior." In 1988, California voters approved Proposition 99, an
initiative which increased the tobacco tax and used that revenue to
fund environmental, health care, and anti-tobacco programs.23 ° In
1998, voters approved Proposition 10, an initiative which raised
tobacco taxes and allocated the revenue to fund early childhood
development and anti-smoking programs.23'
This proposal is not, however, without its drawbacks: requiring
measures that reduce revenue to identify the program(s) that will be
cut or to identify their funding source(s) could hurt unpopular
programs. For instance, voters likely would support cutting
226. In addition, it may be wise to prevent bond measures which would be used to pay
off the state debt. On the one hand, perhaps the state should not take out a loan for thirty
years to pay off its debt in one year. On the other hand, it could be beneficial to pay off
the state's debt in one year, and spread that debt over a number of decades.
227. Gildersleeve, supra note 23, at 1451.
228. Proposition 63: Mental Health Services Expansion Funding. Tax on Personal
Incomes About $1 Million. Initiative Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Guide (2004),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2004g.pdf.
229. Garrett, supra note 142, at 1128.
230. Proposition 99: Cigarette and Tobacco Tax. Benefit Fund. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in Official Voter Information Guide 82-
85 (1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf1988g.pdf.
231. In May of 2009, the legislature placed a number of measures on the ballot meant
to help balance the state's budget. Those measures, all unsuccessful, would have raided
the funding source for the initiatives described above, available at http://vote.ss.ca.gov.
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expenditures for welfare recipients or illegal immigrants. In addition,
this proposal could hurt the most unpopular government program of
all: the legislature itself. The fact that a program or policy is
unpopular does not mean that that program is unwise. Further, this
proposal would increase the complexity of fiscal decisions made by
the voters at the ballot box. Instead of merely deciding whether or
not to approve a program, issue bonds, or reduce taxes and fees, the
voters would also have to make detailed decisions about cutting other
programs and identifying funding sources to make up for reduced
revenue. Accordingly, this reform could exacerbate the concerns
over voter competence already associated with ballot box budgeting.
On balance, requiring measures creating new public programs to
identify their funding source, measures reducing taxes or fees to
specify the programs that should be cut, and measures that call for the
issuance of bonds to identify how those bonds will be paid back in the
short term, is a reasonable response to the problems associated with
ballot box budgeting. This reform would prevent voters from
approving funding cuts and new programs without having to consider
the consequences of those actions on the budget. It would also
prevent the legislature, who must pass a balanced budget, from facing
voter mandates to fund certain programs and reduce taxes without
determining how those competing goals would be accomplished.
B. Reduce the Two-Thirds Requirement for Budget Passage
In forty-two states, legislators can pass budgets by a simple
majority vote.232  Only California, Arkansas, and Rhode Island
require a supermajority of the legislators to vote to pass a budget. 3
This leads to gridlock in Sacramento that causes California to be
chronically late in passing its budget."' As discussed earlier,
legislators must barter for the required number of votes, and often
make less than ideal compromises. The budget process often
dissolves into stalemates, threats of vetoes, and partisan bickering.5
232. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 3.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 7 ("The deadlocks have often left the state unable
to pay some of its bills, including payments to businesses that supply prisons, state
hospitals and other facilities. The latest stalemate, to enact a midyear budget fix because
of declining revenue and set the budget for next fiscal year, also held up state income tax
refunds.").
235. Shane Goldmacher, Arnold Schwarzenegger Says Democrats Are Wasting Time
on Flawed Budget Plans, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2009, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/30/local/me-budget30.
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A few legislators have the ability to hold the state hostage and give
their vote only on the condition that there is increased state spending
in their district. In addition, political parties can refuse to take
responsibility for unpopular budgets and blame the other party.
Budgets that are cobbled together under these circumstances create
an environment ripe for ballot box budgeting. Therefore, one way to
reduce the number of initiatives that address fiscal issues is to reduce
the two-thirds requirement to pass a budget.236
VI. Recommendations to Improve the Initiative Process
This section proposes some recommendations for improving the
initiative process, which in turn would reduce the negative impact of
ballot box budgeting. While budgeting by initiative may lead to fiscal
policies that closely track popular opinion, the process of budgeting
by initiative can also lead to expensive policy decisions made without
a comprehensive view of the budget.
A. Institute the Indirect Initiative
California should reinstitute the indirect initiative process, which
it had until it was repealed from the Constitution in 1966.237 The
indirect initiative process requires proponents of an initiative who
have gathered enough signatures to put that measure on the ballot to
first bring their proposal to the legislature and see if the measure can
be legislatively enacted. 38  If the legislature and the initiative
proponents can come to an agreement, the legislature would enact
that law. 239 This saves the time and expense of an initiative campaign,
and saves the voters from making another decision at the ballot box.
In addition, it could lead to better laws, which have been amended
and refined by the legislature.4 ' The indirect initiative could also
serve as a check on the legislature, allowing them to enact laws which
236. CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, A 21ST CENTURY BUDGET PROCESS FOR
CALIFORNIA: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS BUDGET COMMISSION
24-25 (1998), http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/21stCBudgetProcessforCalifomia.pdf.
237. Miller, supra note 24, at 1047.
238. J. FRED SILVA, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE
PROCESS: BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE (2000), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/
op/OPj1l00FSOP.pdf.
239. Id.
240. See generally Miller, supra note 24, at 1065.
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they might not otherwise consider, but which they would prefer to
enact themselves than have passed via the initiative process.
B. Allow Post-Qualification Modification of Proposed Initiatives
Once a proposed initiative is submitted to the Secretary of State
by the Attorney General, the text of the initiative cannot be changed
regardless of newly discovered information or errors or a desire to
compromise." In this way, initiative proponents are hamstrung. The
legislative process, by comparison, allows bill sponsors many
opportunities to improve the text of their proposals.42 To a certain
extent, the same should be true for initiative proponents.
Initiative proponents should be able to alter the text of an
initiative measure after it qualifies for the ballot and before it is put to
the electorate for a vote. Changes should be permitted to correct
drafting or other technical errors. This will make for better-drafted
and more carefully considered initiatives.
C. Increase Financial Disclosure Requirements
It is vitally important to make sure that the voters are aware of
which individuals and groups support or oppose ballot measures and
which interests have provided financial support or opposition to
ballot measures. This gives the voters important information about
who would be benefited or harmed by an initiative.
This is particularly true with respect to initiatives that affect the
budget. Initiatives calling for the creation or enlargement of costly
programs may be supported only by businesses which provide goods
or services for such programs. In addition, certain initiatives may
benefit only the proponent of that initiative.
Therefore, we suggest that the top five biggest donors for and
against ballot measures be printed in the ballot pamphlet (if time
permits) and listed online through the Secretary of State's official
website. In addition to more financial disclosure, a page should be
added to the ballot pamphlet listings the groups who support and
oppose the initiative measure."'
241. Garrett, supra note 40, at 265.
242. See generally LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL OF CALIFORNIA, OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bil2lawx.html (last visited March 25,2010).
243. In addition, measures that cover the same subject should be identified and placed
next to each other and the public should be notified that only one may be enacted.
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D. Initiatives Prescribing Supermajority Voting Requirements Must be
Passed by a Supermajority of Voters
Those initiatives that mandate supermajority voting
requirements should require supermajority approval for their
enactment." For example, a measure that provides that new tax
increases should have to be approved by two-thirds of the voters
should itself have to be approved by two-thirds of the voters. It is not
fair to allow a simple majority of voters to impose a super majority
requirement for future elections.
E. Allow Post-Enactment Legislative Changes to Statutory Initiatives
California is the only state that has the initiative process that
does not allow the legislature to modify statutory initiatives.2 4 5 At
least one scholar has argued that budgeting by initiative should only
be allowed if the legislature has the power to change those laws.2 46 It
is worth exploring the possibility of making initiatives less permanent
by allowing statutory initiatives to be revised or repealed by the
legislature. This would recognize the need for statutes to be altered
depending on changing circumstances and it would put statutes
enacted by initiative on the same footing as statutes that were
legislatively enacted.247
However, in recognition of the fact that some initiatives may not
be popular with the legislature but may still embody wise policies,
changes should be allowed only if they further the purposes of the
initiative, are passed by two-thirds of the legislature, and are in print
at least fifteen days before passage.2 4 8 Garrett has concluded that the
benefits "of allowing some subsequent legislative involvement-
which facilitates amendments to take account of changed
circumstances, drafting errors, or unintended consequences-
outweigh the risks., 24 9 We agree. Legislative measures are not set in
stone. Initiatives should not be either. Many laws can be amended
and improved as time goes on. Initiatives should not be beyond the
reach of the legislature for time immemorial.5
244. Miller, supra note 24, at 1064.
245. Garrett, supra note 40, at 235; see also Miller, supra note 24, at 1067.
246. Linde, supra note 34, at 1757,
247. Miller, supra note 24, at 1067.
248. See generally Garrett, supra note 40, at 235.
249. Garrett, supra note 142, at 1120.
250. It is important to note that many initiatives already state that they are amendable
by the legislature under certain circumstances.
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VII. Proposals to Reform the Initiative Process That Merit
Further Discussion
A. Sunset Provisions and Constitutional Amendments
Some proposals to reform the initiative process raise the
possibility of imposing sunset provisions on constitutional initiatives
so that they expire approximately one decade after enactment unless
they are reenacted."' This would allow the voters to consider
whether laws that they have added to our constitution have worked as
intended and whether those laws should be maintained. However,
this would greatly increase the number of measures on the ballot, as
proponents would likely seek reenactment in most cases.
B. Pre-election Legal Review of Initiatives
Approximately two-thirds of successful initiatives are challenged
in court, and half of those challenged are invalidated, at least in
part.252 Californians may want to consider some type of legal review
of initiatives before they are placed on the ballot. However,
Californians must do this in a way that does not cause more strain on
the judicial system, the Attorney General, or the Legislative Analyst.
Initiatives could be legally vetted based on a number of concerns:
(1) procedural requirements like qualification rules; (2) subject
matter requirements like the single-subject rule; and (3) compliance
with state and federal constitutional requirements.253 It makes sense
to ensure that procedural requirements have been fulfilled before an
election. It may, however, not make sense for the courts to insert
themselves into initiative campaigns to rule on the state or federal
constitutionality of proposal before it becomes law. Such disputes
may not be ripe for judicial review, overtax the court system, and/or
raise questions about the separation of powers.254 This leaves open
the question of whether the courts should conduct substantive pre-
election review of initiatives. This type of review would raise similar
questions as to whether courts should become part of the initiative
process prior to the election and whether it might spread the already
251. Garrett, supra note 40, at 235. Constitutional initiatives and constitutional
legislative measures can be amended in the same way: a two-thirds vote of the legislature
and a majority vote of the people. CAL. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
252. Miller, supra note 24, at 1068-69.
253. Id. at 1069.
254. Id.
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busy court system too thin. Reformers must determine whether they
want the courts to perform a gate-keeping function.25
Instead of asking the courts to legally vet initiatives prior to the
election, some have called for the Attorney General to perform this
duty.2 6 The Attorney General could be given the power to remove an
initiative from the ballot if it did not meet certain procedural
requirements, or if it violated subject matter restrictions. The
Attorney General could also issue advisory opinions regarding the
state and federal constitutionality of the initiative.257 In California,
the Attorney General is a partisan elected official and drafts the
ballot title and summary. Some have therefore called for this duty to




On balance, we caution against implementing this proposal.
C. Make It More Difficult To Pass Initiatives
1. Require Two- Thirds Approval for Initiatives that Affect the Budget
While the goal of the initiative process may be to put the
electorate on the same footing as the legislature, the people should
not be on higher ground than their elected representatives. By
initiative, the people can pass measures which affect the budget by a
simple majority. California's representatives, however, can enact a
budget only by a two-thirds vote of both the Assembly and the
Senate.5 9 While the initiative may serve the valid purpose of acting as
a check on the legislature, this does not mean that it should be easier
to do by initiative that which should be done by the legislature.
This proposal would make it more difficult to alter the budget by
initiative but it would not address the reasons why ballot box
budgeting is so problematic. The primary problem with budgeting by
initiative is that the voters lack a comprehensive view of the budget
and are not unaccountable to their fellow citizens in the way that
elected legislators are politically accountable to their constituents.
Instead of advocating for the implementation of this proposal, we
favor a simple majority vote both for initiatives and legislative
measures that impact the state's budget. California's current two-
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1072.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1072-73.
259. CAL. CONST. art IV, § 12.
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thirds requirement to pass a budget has led to gridlock, partisan
bickering, and less than ideal compromises.
2. Make It More Difficult To Pass Constitutional Initiatives
Voters can amend our state's constitution by a simple majority
vote. The legislature can amend the constitution only by a two-thirds
vote that is later put to a ratifying vote of the people.2'6 It should be
harder to amend our state constitution, particularly with respect to
measures that affect the legislature's ability to pass a balanced
budget. Linde has argued that "[i]f an expenditure or a tax law is to
be locked into a constitution, it requires prior legislative
deliberation."
261
Our state constitution is one of the longest constitutions
currently in force and has been amended more than 500 times. A
constitution should embody a relatively timeless set of norms rather
than the changing opinions and passions of the electorate.
Constitutional initiatives, particularly those that apply to budgetary
issues and may depend on the state's fiscal well-being, however, may
"not transcend time, change political mores, or represent general
fundamental values.,
263
One way to make it more difficult to amend our state
constitution would be to require sixty percent of the voters to
approve initiatives that amend the constitution. Similarly, many have
proposed requiring that constitutional amendments pass in two
consecutive elections before they take effect.26
At this time, we do not endorse either of those proposals. Our
constitution is full of measures which are not traditionally
constitutional and which do not represent a timeless set of norms. In
an ideal world, we would recommend making it more difficult to
amend our constitution by initiative in certain situations, including
initiatives which affect the budget.
260. Frickey, supra note 40, at 430.
261. Linde, supra note 34.
262. See generally Miller, supra note 24, at 1045-46; see also Ryan Maloney, Smoking
Laws, High-Speed Trains, and Fishing News A State Constitution Does Not Make: Florida's
Desperate Need for A Statutory Citizens Initiative, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 100
(2002) ("By transcending time and changing political mores, the constitution is a
document that provides stability in the law and society's consensus on general,
fundamental values.").
263. Id.
264. Miller, supra note 24, at 1063-64.
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Conclusion
Ballot box budgeting in California has become a hot button topic
as the economy of the state dominates political debate. Many
observers believe that if the initiative process had been prevented
from adding programs, guaranteeing funding for schools, cutting taxes
or floating bond measures that California would not be in today's
fiscal mess. We think that is a valid but exaggerated argument. Both
the electorate and California's elected officials bear a significant
portion of the responsibility for the state of our state. The time for
endless, and perhaps unrealistic, optimism with respect to California's
economy is over.
One solution to ballot box budgeting is to require any ballot
measures affecting the budget to identify which programs will be cut,
which taxes will be increased, and/or how bonds will be paid back.
This solution will do at least two things. First, fewer measures will be
approved because the debate on these measures will include not just
the merits of the program being proposed but also how the measure
will be implemented. Second, the legislature will not be forced to
enact future budgets that must account for the newly enacted and
unfunded ballot measure through cuts to other programs or tax
increases. While there are advantages to requiring all initiative
measures to identify their funding sources, there are also downsides
to such a requirement. It may mean more ballot box budgeting by the
public and less legislative decision-making. If every initiative that has
an impact on the budget must identify programs to be cut, the
proponents will be engaging in two (rather than one) act of ballot box
budgeting. First, they will be proposing new programs or increases in
existing programs. Second, they will be using their scalpel on existing
programs by telling the legislature which programs must be slashed to
pay for the new law. The other problem with this proposed reform is
that unpopular programs will be slashed or eliminated. The first
agency to be cut could be the most unpopular agency in the state: the
legislature itself. The next programs to be cut will be those that only
affect minority groups rather than the public at large: welfare,
immigration, health care for poor children, among others. Other
ways to reduce the impact of ballot box budgeting on the state's fiscal
decision-making process should also be seriously explored, including
reducing the two-thirds requirement needed to pass a budget in
California, reinstituting the indirect initiative, and increasing financial
disclosures.
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Finally, the state's ballot box budgeting epidemic may correct
itself if fewer measures are approved by the public due to harder
economic times. It is likely that fewer ballot measures that increase
state spending or cut revenues will be passed in the near future.
Sooner or later, the public may realize that there is no such thing as a
free lunch-even in California.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
APPENDIX 1
Number of Bond Measures
Initiative vs. Legislative
a CENTExfor GOVeRNMENTAL STUDIES
14
12
1988 199 1992 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Billions Ig ainitiatl'es a L.g1slatie Measure I
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E OP PROP TITLE I
A # [nit












School facilities $800 $630 $1,430 20 yr Bond Bonds





Veterans bond $510 $610 $1,120 25 yr Bond Bonds
act of 1988. @ 7.5%
76 1988 Cal. Stat. L =$45/yr
26
AB 69










Higher $600 $475 $1,075 20 yr Bond Bonds
education @ 7.5%
facilities bond =$50/yr














1 New prison $817 $650 $1,467 20 yr Bond Bonds
9 construction @ 7.5%
8 bond of 1988. =$70/yr
8 80 1988 Cal. Stat. L
43
SB 468













Water $60 $58 $118 20 yr Bond Bonds
conservation @ 7.5%





Clean water & $65 $55 $120 20 yr Bond Bonds
reclamation @ 7.5%





Housing & $300 $235 $535 20 yr Bond Bonds
homeless bond @7.5%




Library $75 $59 $134 20 yr Bond Bonds
construction & @7.5%
renovation =$6/yr















$400 $900 20 yr Bond
@ 7.5%
=$40/yr











108 Passenger rail $1,000 $790 $1,790 20 yr Bond Bonds
& clean air @ 7.5%

































Stat. 6 SB 147
122 Earthquake L $300 $235 $535 20 yr Bond Bonds
safety & public @7.5%
buildings =$27/yr
rehabilitation
123 School facilities L $800 $630 $1,430 20 yr Bond Bonds
bond act @ 7.5%
=$70/yr
142 Veterans bond L $400 $500 $900 25 yr Bond Bonds
act of 1990. @7.5%
1990 Cal. Stat. =$37/yr










1 152 School facilities L $1,900 $1,400 $3,300 20 yr Bond Bonds
9 bond act of @ 7%
9 1992. 1992 Cal. =$165/yr
2 Stat. 12 AB 880





Stat. 13 SB 119
155 School facilities L $900 $700 $1,600 20 yr Bond Bonds
bond act 1992 @7%
Cal. Stat. 117 =$80/yr
SB 34
1 192 Seismic L $2,000 $1,400 $3,400 25 yr Bond Bonds
9 Retrofit Bond @ 5.5%
9 Act of 1996 =$136/yr




204 Safe, Clean, L $995 $776 $1,771 25 yr Bond Bonds
Reliable Water @ 5.5%
Supply Act =$71/yr
206 Veteran's L $400 $300 $700 25 yr Bond Bonds
Bond Act of @6%
1996 =$28/yr
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2 12 Safe L $2,100 $1,500 $3,600 25 yr Bond Bonds
0 Neighborhood @ 5.5%







13 Safe Drinking L $1,970 $1,400 $3,370 25 yr Bond Bonds







14 California L $350 $250 $600 25 yr Bond Bonds





16 Veterans L $26 $7 $33 25 yr Bond Bonds
Homes Bond @ Unknown
Act of 2000. Interest
=$1/yr
32 Veterans' L $500 $358 $858 25 yr Bond Bonds














41 Voting L $200 $55 $255 10 yr Bond Bonds
Modernization @5%
Bond Act of =$26/yr
2002. (Shelley-
Hertzberg Act)
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2 55 Kindergarten- L $12,300 $12,400 $24,700 30 yr Bond Bonds





57 The Economic L $15,000 $14,100 $29,100 Differing Bonds
Recovery Bond Estimates.
Act 14 Yrs if
Only Sales
Tax is Used











71 Stem Cell 1 $3,000 $3,000 $6,000 30 yr Bond Bonds
Research @ 5.25%
Funding Bonds -4200/yr
2 1B Highway L $19,925 $19,000 $38,925 30 yr Bond Bonds
0 Safety, Traffic @5%






























2006 1 1 1 1
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2 IA Safe, Reliable L $9,950 $9,450 $19,400 30 yr Bond Bonds
0 High-Speed @ Unknown
0 Passenger Interest=
8 Train Bond $647/yr
Act




12 Veterans' L $900 $856 $1,756 30 yr Bond Bonds
Bond Act of @5%
2008 =$59/yr
*All interest is based off of the projected selling and repayment of bonds with their fixed amount
of interest over 20-30 years depending on specific circumstances
**All monetary values are based in millions of dollars and have not been indexed for inflation
***Unable to be determined by Legislative analysts
****All values are estimates given by the Legislative Analyst's Office and may not reflect actual
expenditures due to changes in interest rates
*****Does not include Bonds for 1988 since they have expired
Overview
Voter Initiatives Total Interest Total Per Yr % of Total
(88-08) Base Cost Cost**** Cost
Spending
7 $16,324 $15,448 $31,772 $1,074 11.6%
Legislative Measures Total Interest Total Per Yr % of Total
(88-08) Base Cost Cost**** Cost
Spending *
45 $126,724 $114,999 $241,723 $7,390 88.4%




52 $143,048 $130,447 $273,495
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